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ABSTRACT
LDP (Local Differential Privacy) has been widely studied
to estimate statistics of personal data (e.g., distribution un-
derlying the data) while protecting users’ privacy. Although
LDP does not require a trusted third party, it regards all
personal data equally sensitive, which causes excessive ob-
fuscation hence the loss of utility.
In this paper, we introduce the notion of ULDP (Utility-
optimized LDP), which provides a privacy guarantee equiv-
alent to LDP only for sensitive data. We first consider the
setting where all users use the same obfuscation mecha-
nism, and propose two mechanisms providing ULDP: utility-
optimized randomized response and utility-optimized RAP-
POR. We then consider the setting where the distinction
between sensitive and non-sensitive data can be different
from user to user. For this setting, we propose a personal-
ized ULDP mechanism with semantic tags to estimate the
distribution of personal data with high utility while keep-
ing secret what is sensitive for each user. We show, both
theoretically and experimentally, that our mechanisms pro-
vide much higher utility than the existing LDP mechanisms
when there are a lot of non-sensitive data. We also show
that when most of the data are non-sensitive, our mecha-
nisms even provide almost the same utility as non-private
mechanisms in the low privacy regime.
1. INTRODUCTION
DP (Differential Privacy) [21, 22] is becoming a gold stan-
dard for data privacy; it enables big data analysis while
protecting users’ privacy against adversaries with arbitrary
background knowledge. According to the underlying archi-
tecture, DP can be categorized into the one in the centralized
model and the one in the local model [22]. In the central-
ized model, a “trusted” database administrator, who can
access to all users’ personal data, obfuscates the data (e.g.,
∗This study was supported by JSPS KAKENHI
JP19H04113, JP17K12667, and by Inria under the
project LOGIS.
by adding noise, generalization) before providing them to a
(possibly malicious) data analyst. Although DP was exten-
sively studied for the centralized model at the beginning,
the original personal data in this model can be leaked from
the database by illegal access or internal fraud. This issue is
critical in recent years, because the number of data breach
incidents is increasing [15].
The local model does not require a “trusted” adminis-
trator, and therefore does not suffer from the data leakage
issue explained above. In this model, each user obfuscates
her personal data by herself, and sends the obfuscated data
to a data collector (or data analyst). Based on the obfus-
cated data, the data collector can estimate some statistics
(e.g., histogram, heavy hitters [44]) of the personal data. DP
in the local model, which is called LDP (Local Differential
Privacy) [19], has recently attracted much attention in the
academic field [5, 12, 24, 29, 30, 39, 42, 44, 45, 49, 56], and
has also been adopted by industry [16, 48, 23].
However, LDP mechanisms regard all personal data as
equally sensitive, and leave a lot of room for increasing data
utility. For example, consider questionnaires such as: “Have
you ever cheated in an exam?” and “Were you with a prosti-
tute in the last month?” [11]. Obviously, “Yes” is a sensitive
response to these questionnaires, whereas “No” is not sen-
sitive. A RR (Randomized Response) method proposed by
Mangat [37] utilizes this fact. Specifically, it reports “Yes”
or “No” as follows: if the true answer is “Yes”, always report
“Yes”; otherwise, report “Yes” and “No” with probability
p and 1 − p, respectively. Since the reported answer “Yes”
may come from both the true answers “Yes” and “No”, the
confidentiality of the user reporting “Yes” is not violated.
Moreover, since the reported answer “No” is always come
from the true answer “No”, the data collector can estimate
a distribution of true answers with higher accuracy than
Warner’s RR [51], which simply flips “Yes” and ”No” with
probability p. However, Mangat’s RR does not provide LDP,
since LDP regards both “Yes” and “No” as equally sensitive.
There are a lot of “non-sensitive” data for other types of
data. For example, locations such as hospitals and home can
be sensitive, whereas visited sightseeing places, restaurants,
and coffee shops are non-sensitive for many users. Divorced
people may want to keep their divorce secret, while the oth-
ers may not care about their marital status. The distinction
between sensitive and non-sensitive data can also be differ-
ent from user to user (e.g., home address is different from
user to user; some people might want to keep secret even
the sightseeing places). To explain more about this issue,
we briefly review related work on LDP and variants of DP.
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Related work. Since Dwork [21] introduced DP, a number
of its variants have been studied to provide different types of
privacy guarantees; e.g., LDP [19], d-privacy [8], Pufferfish
privacy [32], dependent DP [36], Bayesian DP [53], mutual-
information DP [14], Re´nyi DP [38], and distribution privacy
[31]. In particular, LDP [19] has been widely studied in the
literature. For example, Erlingsson et al. [23] proposed the
RAPPOR as an obfuscation mechanism providing LDP, and
implemented it in Google Chrome browser. Kairouz et al.
[29] showed that under the l1 and l2 losses, the randomized
response (generalized to multiple alphabets) and RAPPOR
are order optimal among all LDP mechanisms in the low and
high privacy regimes, respectively. Wang et al. [50] general-
ized the RAPPOR and a random projection-based method
[6], and found parameters that minimize the variance of the
estimate.
Some studies also attempted to address the non-uniformity
of privacy requirements among records (rows) or among
items (columns) in the centralized DP: Personalized DP [28],
Heterogeneous DP [3], and One-sided DP [17]. However, ob-
fuscation mechanisms that address the non-uniformity among
input values in the “local” DP have not been studied, to our
knowledge. In this paper, we show that data utility can be
significantly increased by designing such local mechanisms.
Our contributions. The goal of this paper is to design
obfuscation mechanisms in the local model that achieve high
data utility while providing DP for sensitive data. To achieve
this, we introduce the notion of ULDP (Utility-optimized
LDP), which provides a privacy guarantee equivalent to LDP
only for sensitive data, and obfuscation mechanisms provid-
ing ULDP. As a task for the data collector, we consider dis-
crete distribution estimation [2, 24, 27, 29, 39, 45, 23, 56],
where personal data take discrete values. Our contributions
are as follows:
• We first consider the setting in which all users use the
same obfuscation mechanism, and propose two ULDP
mechanisms: utility-optimized RR and utility-optimized
RAPPOR. We prove that when there are a lot of non-
sensitive data, our mechanisms provide much higher
utility than two state-of-the-art LDP mechanisms: the
RR (for multiple alphabets) [29, 30] and RAPPOR
[23]. We also prove that when most of the data are
non-sensitive, our mechanisms even provide almost the
same utility as a non-private mechanism that does not
obfuscate the personal data in the low privacy regime
where the privacy budget is ǫ = ln |X | for a set X of
personal data.
• We then consider the setting in which the distinction
between sensitive and non-sensitive data can be dif-
ferent from user to user, and propose a PUM (Per-
sonalized ULDP Mechanism) with semantic tags. The
PUM keeps secret what is sensitive for each user, while
enabling the data collector to estimate a distribution
using some background knowledge about the distribu-
tion conditioned on each tag (e.g., geographic distri-
butions of homes). We also theoretically analyze the
data utility of the PUM.
• We finally show that our mechanisms are very promis-
ing in terms of utility using two large-scale datasets.
The proofs of all statements in the paper are given in the
appendices.
Cautions and limitations. Although ULDP is meant to
protect sensitive data, there are some cautions and limita-
tions.
First, we assume that each user sends a single datum
and that each user’s personal data is independent (see Sec-
tion 2.1). This is reasonable for a variety of personal data
(e.g., locations, age, sex, marital status), where each user’s
data is irrelevant to most others’ one. However, for some
types of personal data (e.g., flu status [47]), each user can
be highly influenced by others. There might also be a cor-
relation between sensitive data and non-sensitive data when
a user sends multiple data (on a related note, non-sensitive
attributes may lead to re-identification of a record [40]). A
possible solution to these problems would be to incorpo-
rate ULDP with Pufferfish privacy [32, 47], which is used to
protect correlated data. We leave this as future work (see
Section 7 for discussions on the case of multiple data per
user and the correlation issue).
We focus on a scenario in which it is easy for users to
decide what is sensitive (e.g., cheating experience, location
of home). However, there is also a scenario in which users
do not know what is sensitive. For the latter scenario, we
cannot use ULDP but can simply apply LDP.
Apart from the sensitive/non-sensitive data issue, there
are scenarios in which ULDP does not cover. For example,
ULDP does not protect users who have a sensitivity about
“information disclosure” itself (i.e., those who will not dis-
close any information). We assume that users have con-
sented to information disclosure. To collect as much data
as possible, we can provide an incentive for the informa-
tion disclosure; e.g., provide a reward or point-of-interest
(POI) information nearby a reported location. We also as-
sume that the data collector obtains a consensus from users
before providing reported data to third parties. Note that
these cautions are common to LDP.
There might also be a risk of discrimination; e.g., the data
collector might discriminate against all users that provide a
yes-answer, and have no qualms about small false positives.
False positives decrease with increase in ǫ. We note that
LDP also suffer from this attack; the false positive proba-
bility is the same for both ULDP and LDP with the same
ǫ.
In summary, ULDP provides a privacy guarantee equiva-
lent to LDP for sensitive data under the assumption of the
data independence. We consider our work as a building-
block of broader DP approaches or the basis for further de-
velopment.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Notations
Let R≥0 be the set of non-negative real numbers. Let
n be the number of users, [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}, X (resp. Y)
be a finite set of personal (resp. obfuscated) data. We as-
sume continuous data are discretized into bins in advance
(e.g., a location map is divided into some regions). We
use the superscript “(i)” to represent the i-th user. Let
X(i) (resp. Y (i)) be a random variable representing personal
(resp. obfuscated) data of the i-th user. The i-th user obfus-
cates her personal data X(i) via her obfuscation mechanism
Q(i), which maps x ∈ X to y ∈ Y with probabilityQ(i)(y|x),
and sends the obfuscated data Y (i) to a data collector. Here
2
we assume that each user sends a single datum. We discuss
the case of multiple data in Section 7.
We divide personal data into two types: sensitive data
and non-sensitive data. Let XS ⊆ X be a set of sensitive
data common to all users, and XN = X \XS be the remain-
ing personal data. Examples of such “common” sensitive
data x ∈ XS are the regions including public sensitive lo-
cations (e.g., hospitals) and obviously sensitive responses to
questionnaires described in Section 11.
Furthermore, let X (i)S ⊆ XN (i ∈ [n]) be a set of sensi-
tive data specific to the i-th user (here we do not include
XS into X (i)S because XS is protected for all users in our
mechanisms). X (i)S is a set of personal data that is possibly
non-sensitive for many users but sensitive for the i-th user.
Examples of such “user-specific” sensitive data x ∈ X (i)S are
the regions including private locations such as their home
and workplace. (Note that the majority of working popula-
tion can be uniquely identified from their home/workplace
location pairs [25].)
In Sections 3 and 4, we consider the case where all users
divide X into the same sets of sensitive data and of non-
sensitive data, i.e., X (1)S = · · · = X (n)S = ∅, and use the same
obfuscation mechanism Q (i.e., Q = Q(1) = · · · = Q(n)). In
Section 5, we consider a general setting that can deal with
the user-specific sensitive data X (i)S and user-specific mech-
anisms Q(i). We call the former case a common-mechanism
scenario and the latter a personalized-mechanism scenario.
We assume that each user’s personal data X(i) is indepen-
dently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with a probability
distribution p, which generates x ∈ X with probability p(x).
Let X = (X(1), · · · , X(n)) and Y = (Y (1), · · · , Y (n)) be tu-
ples of all personal data and all obfuscated data, respec-
tively. The data collector estimates p from Y by a method
described in Section 2.5. We denote by pˆ the estimate of
p. We further denote by C the probability simplex; i.e.,
C = {p|∑x∈X p(x) = 1,p(x) ≥ 0 for any x ∈ X}.
In Appendix A, we also show the basic notations in Ta-
ble 2.
2.2 Privacy Measures
LDP (Local Differential Privacy) [19] is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (ǫ-LDP). Let ǫ ∈ R≥0. An obfuscation mech-
anism Q from X to Y provides ǫ-LDP if for any x, x′ ∈ X
and any y ∈ Y,
Q(y|x) ≤ eǫQ(y|x′). (1)
LDP guarantees that an adversary who has observed y
cannot determine, for any pair of x and x′, whether it is
come from x or x′ with a certain degree of confidence. As
the privacy budget ǫ approaches to 0, all of the data in
X become almost equally likely. Thus, a user’s privacy is
strongly protected when ǫ is small.
2.3 Utility Measures
In this paper, we use the l1 loss (i.e., absolute error) and
the l2 loss (i.e., squared error) as utility measures. Let
1Note that these data might be sensitive for many/most
users but not for all in practice (e.g., some people might
not care about their cheating experience). However, we can
regard these data as sensitive for all users (i.e., be on the
safe side) by allowing a small loss of data utility.
l1 (resp. l
2
2) be the l1 (resp. l2) loss function, which maps
the estimate pˆ and the true distribution p to the loss; i.e.,
l1(pˆ,p) =
∑
x∈X |pˆ(x) − p(x)|, l22(pˆ,p) =
∑
x∈X (pˆ(x) −
p(x))2. It should be noted that X is generated from p and
Y is generated from X using Q(1), · · · ,Q(n). Since pˆ is
computed from Y, both the l1 and l2 losses depend on Y.
In our theoretical analysis in Sections 4 and 5, we take
the expectation of the l1 loss over all possible realizations
of Y. In our experiments in Section 6, we replace the ex-
pectation of the l1 loss with the sample mean over multiple
realizations of Y and divide it by 2 to evaluate the TV (To-
tal Variation). In Appendix E, we also show that the l2 loss
has similar results to the ones in Sections 4 and 6 by eval-
uating the expectation of the l2 loss and the MSE (Mean
Squared Error), respectively.
2.4 Obfuscation Mechanisms
We describe the RR (Randomized Response) [29, 30] and
a generalized version of the RAPPOR [50] as follows.
Randomized response. The RR for |X |-ary alphabets
was studied in [29, 30]. Its output range is identical to the
input domain; i.e., X = Y.
Formally, given ǫ ∈ R≥0, the ǫ-RR is an obfuscation mech-
anism that maps x to y with the probability:
QRR(y|x) =
{
eǫ
|X|+eǫ−1 (if y = x)
1
|X|+eǫ−1 (otherwise).
(2)
It is easy to check by (1) and (2) that QRR provides ǫ-LDP.
Generalized RAPPOR. The RAPPOR (Randomized
Aggregatable Privacy-Preserving Ordinal Response) [23] is
an obfuscation mechanism implemented in Google Chrome
browser. Wang et al. [50] extended its simplest configura-
tion called the basic one-time RAPPOR by generalizing two
probabilities in perturbation. Here we call it the generalized
RAPPOR and describe its algorithm in detail.
The generalized RAPPOR is an obfuscation mechanism
with the input alphabet X = {x1, x2, · · · , x|X|} and the out-
put alphabet Y = {0, 1}|X|. It first deterministically maps
xi ∈ X to ei ∈ {0, 1}|X|, where ei is the i-th standard ba-
sis vector. It then probabilistically flips each bit of ei to
obtain obfuscated data y = (y1, y2, · · · , y|X|) ∈ {0, 1}|X|,
where yi ∈ {0, 1} is the i-th element of y. Wang et al. [50]
compute ǫ from two parameters θ ∈ [0, 1] (representing the
probability of keeping 1 unchanged) and ψ ∈ [0, 1] (repre-
senting the probability of flipping 0 into 1). In this paper,
we compute ψ from two parameters θ and ǫ.
Specifically, given θ ∈ [0, 1] and ǫ ∈ R≥0, the (θ, ǫ)-
generalized RAPPOR maps xi to y with the probability:
QRAP (y|xi) =∏1≤j≤|X| Pr(yj |xi),
where Pr(yj |xi) = θ if i = j and yj = 1, and Pr(yj |xi) =
1 − θ if i = j and yj = 0, and Pr(yj |xi) = ψ = θ(1−θ)eǫ+θ if
i 6= j and yj = 1, and Pr(yj |xi) = 1−ψ otherwise. The basic
one-time RAPPOR [23] is a special case of the generalized
RAPPOR where θ = e
ǫ/2
eǫ/2+1
. QRAP also provides ǫ-LDP.
2.5 Distribution Estimation Methods
Here we explain the empirical estimation method [2, 27,
29] and the EM reconstruction method [1, 2]. Both of them
assume that the data collector knows the obfuscation mech-
anism Q used to generate Y from X.
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Figure 1: Overview of ULDP. It has no transitions
from XS to YI , and every output in YI reveals the
corresponding input in XN . It also provides ǫ-LDP
for YP .
Empirical estimation method. The empirical estimation
method [2, 27, 29] computes an empirical estimate pˆ of p
using an empirical distribution mˆ of the obfuscated data
Y. Note that pˆ, mˆ, and Q can be represented as an |X |-
dimensional vector, |Y|-dimensional vector, and |X | × |Y|
matrix, respectively. They have the following equation:
pˆQ = mˆ. (3)
The empirical estimation method computes pˆ by solving (3).
Let m be the true distribution of obfuscated data; i.e.,
m = pQ. As the number of users n increases, the empiri-
cal distribution mˆ converges to m. Therefore, the empirical
estimate pˆ also converges to p. However, when the number
of users n is small, many elements in pˆ can be negative.
To address this issue, the studies in [23, 50] kept only es-
timates above a significance threshold determined via Bon-
ferroni correction, and discarded the remaining estimates.
EM reconstruction method. The EM (Expectation-
Maximization) reconstruction method [1, 2] (also called the
iterative Bayesian technique [2]) regards X as a hidden vari-
able and estimates p from Y using the EM algorithm [26]
(for details of the algorithm, see [1, 2]). Let pˆEM be an es-
timate of p by the EM reconstruction method. The feature
of this algorithm is that pˆEM is equal to the maximum like-
lihood estimate in the probability simplex C (see [1] for the
proof). Since this property holds irrespective of the number
of users n, the elements in pˆEM are always non-negative.
In this paper, our theoretical analysis uses the empirical
estimation method for simplicity, while our experiments use
the empirical estimation method, the one with the signifi-
cance threshold, and the EM reconstruction method.
3. UTILITY-OPTIMIZED LDP (ULDP)
In this section, we focus on the common-mechanism sce-
nario (outlined in Section 2.1) and introduce ULDP (Utility-
optimized Local Differential Privacy), which provides a pri-
vacy guarantee equivalent to ǫ-LDP only for sensitive data.
Section 3.1 provides the definition of ULDP. Section 3.2
shows some theoretical properties of ULDP.
3.1 Definition
Figure 1 shows an overview of ULDP. An obfuscation
mechanism providing ULDP, which we call the utility-optimized
mechanism, divides obfuscated data into protected data and
invertible data. Let YP be a set of protected data, and
YI = Y \ YP be a set of invertible data.
The feature of the utility-optimized mechanism is that it
maps sensitive data x ∈ XS to only protected data y ∈
YP . In other words, it restricts the output set, given the
input x ∈ XS, to YP . Then it provides ǫ-LDP for YP ; i.e.,
Q(y|x) ≤ eǫQ(y|x′) for any x, x′ ∈ X and any y ∈ YP . By
this property, a privacy guarantee equivalent to ǫ-LDP is
provided for any sensitive data x ∈ XS, since the output
set corresponding to XS is restricted to YP . In addition,
every output in YI reveals the corresponding input in XN
(as in Mangat’s randomized response [37]) to optimize the
estimation accuracy.
We now formally define ULDP and the utility-optimized
mechanism:
Definition 2 ((XS,YP , ǫ)-ULDP). Given XS ⊆ X , YP ⊆
Y, and ǫ ∈ R≥0, an obfuscation mechanism Q from X to Y
provides (XS,YP , ǫ)-ULDP if it satisfies the following prop-
erties:
1. For any y ∈ YI , there exists an x ∈ XN such that
Q(y|x) > 0 and Q(y|x′) = 0 for any x′ 6= x. (4)
2. For any x, x′ ∈ X and any y ∈ YP ,
Q(y|x) ≤ eǫQ(y|x′). (5)
We refer to an obfuscation mechanism Q providing (XS,YP ,
ǫ)-ULDP as the (XS ,YP , ǫ)-utility-optimized mechanism.
Example. For an intuitive understanding of Definition 2,
we show that Mangat’s randomized response [37] provides
(XS,YP , ǫ)-ULDP. As described in Section 1, this mecha-
nism considers binary alphabets (i.e., X = Y = {0, 1}), and
regards the value 1 as sensitive (i.e., XS = YP = {1}). If the
input value is 1, it always reports 1 as output. Otherwise,
it reports 1 and 0 with probability p and 1− p, respectively.
Obviously, this mechanism does not provide ǫ-LDP for any
ǫ ∈ [0,∞). However, it provides (XS,YP , ln 1p )-ULDP.
(XS,YP , ǫ)-ULDP provides a privacy guarantee equivalent
to ǫ-LDP for any sensitive data x ∈ XS, as explained above.
On the other hand, no privacy guarantees are provided for
non-sensitive data x ∈ XN because every output in YI re-
veals the corresponding input in XN . However, it does not
matter since non-sensitive data need not be protected. Pro-
tecting only minimum necessary data is the key to achieving
locally private distribution estimation with high data utility.
We can apply any ǫ-LDP mechanism to the sensitive data
in XS to provide (XS,YP , ǫ)-ULDP as a whole. In Sec-
tions 4.1 and 4.2, we propose a utility-optimized RR (Ran-
domized Response) and utility-optimized RAPPOR, which
apply the ǫ-RR and ǫ-RAPPOR, respectively, to the sensi-
tive data XS .
It might be better to generalize ULDP so that different
levels of ǫ can be assigned to different sensitive data. We
leave introducing such granularity as future work.
Remark. It should also be noted that the data collector
needs to know Q to estimate p from Y (as described in Sec-
tion 2.5), and that the (XS ,YP , ǫ)-utility-optimized mecha-
nism Q itself includes the information on what is sensitive
for users (i.e., the data collector learns whether each x ∈ X
belongs to XS or not by checking the values of Q(y|x) for
all y ∈ Y). This does not matter in the common-mechanism
scenario, since the set XS of sensitive data is common to all
users (e.g., public hospitals). However, in the personalized-
mechanism scenario, the (XS ∪X (i)S ,YP , ǫ)-utility-optimized
mechanism Q(i), which expands the set XS of personal data
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to XS∪X (i)S , includes the information on what is sensitive for
the i-th user. Therefore, the data collector learns whether
each x ∈ XN belongs to X (i)S or not by checking the val-
ues of Q(i)(y|x) for all y ∈ Y, despite the fact that the i-th
user wants to hide her user-specific sensitive data X (i)S (e.g.,
home, workplace). We address this issue in Section 5.
3.2 Basic Properties of ULDP
Previous work showed some basic properties of differen-
tial privacy (or its variant), such as compositionality [22]
and immunity to post-processing [22]. We briefly explain
theoretical properties of ULDP including the ones above.
Sequential composition. ULDP is preserved under adap-
tive sequential composition when the composed obfuscation
mechanism maps sensitive data to pairs of protected data.
Specifically, consider two mechanisms Q0 from X to Y0 and
Q1 from X to Y1 such that Q0 (resp. Q1) maps sensitive
data x ∈ XS to protected data y0 ∈ Y0P (resp. y1 ∈ Y1P ).
Then the sequential composition of Q0 and Q1 maps sensi-
tive data x ∈ XS to pairs (y0, y1) of protected data ranging
over:
(Y0 × Y1)P = {(y0, y1) ∈ Y0 × Y1 | y0 ∈ Y0P and y1 ∈ Y1P } .
Then we obtain the following compositionality.
Proposition 1 (Sequential composition). Let ε0, ε1 ≥ 0. If
Q0 provides (XS,Y0P , ε0)-ULDP and Q1(y0) provides (XS ,
Y1P , ε1)-ULDP for each y0 ∈ Y0, then the sequential com-
position of Q0 and Q1 provides (XS, (Y0 × Y1)P , ε0 + ε1)-
ULDP.
For example, if we apply an obfuscation mechanism pro-
viding (XS,YP , ǫ)-ULDP for t times, then we obtain (XS ,
(YP )t, ǫt)-ULDP in total (this is derived by repeatedly us-
ing Proposition 1).
Post-processing. ULDP is immune to the post-processing
by a randomized algorithm that preserves data types: pro-
tected data or invertible data. Specifically, if a mechanism
Q0 provides (XS,YP , ε)-ULDP and a randomized algorithm
Q1 maps protected data over YP (resp. invertible data) to
protected data over ZP (resp. invertible data), then the
composite function Q1 ◦Q0 provides (XS,ZP , ε)-ULDP.
Note that Q1 needs to preserve data types for utility;
i.e., to make all y ∈ YI invertible (as in Definition 2) after
post-processing. The DP guarantee for y ∈ YP is preserved
by any post-processing algorithm. See Appendix B.2 for
details.
Compatibility with LDP. Assume that data collectors
A and B adopt a mechanism providing ULDP and a mecha-
nism providing LDP, respectively. In this case, all protected
data in the data collector A can be combined with all ob-
fuscated data in the data collector B (i.e., data integration)
to perform data analysis under LDP. See Appendix B.3 for
details.
Lower bounds on the l1 and l2 losses. We present lower
bounds on the l1 and l2 losses of any ULDP mechanism by
using the fact that ULDP provides (5) for any x, x′ ∈ XS
and any y ∈ YP . Specifically, Duchi et al. [20] showed
that for ǫ ∈ [0, 1], the lower bounds on the l1 and l2 losses
(minimax rates) of any ǫ-LDP mechanism can be expressed
as Θ( |X|√
nǫ2
) and Θ( |X|
nǫ2
), respectively. By directly applying
these bounds to XS and YP , the lower bounds on the l1 and
x1 x1
x2 x2
x3 x3
x4 x4
x5 x5
x6 x6
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Figure 2: Utility-optimized RR in the case where
XS = YP = {x1, x2, x3} and XN = YI = {x4, x5, x6}.
l2 losses of any (XS,YP , ǫ)-ULDP mechanisms for ǫ ∈ [0, 1]
can be expressed as Θ( |XS |√
nǫ2
) and Θ( |XS|
nǫ2
), respectively. In
Section 4.3, we show that our utility-optimized RAPPOR
achieves these lower bounds when ǫ is close to 0 (i.e., high
privacy regime).
4. UTILITY-OPTIMIZED MECHANISMS
In this section, we focus on the common-mechanism sce-
nario and propose the utility-optimized RR (Randomized Re-
sponse) and utility-optimized RAPPOR (Sections 4.1 and
4.2). We then analyze the data utility of these mechanisms
(Section 4.3).
4.1 Utility-Optimized Randomized Response
We propose the utility-optimized RR, which is a gener-
alization of Mangat’s randomized response [37] to |X |-ary
alphabets with |XS | sensitive symbols. As with the RR, the
output range of the utility-optimized RR is identical to the
input domain; i.e., X = Y. In addition, we divide the out-
put set in the same way as the input set; i.e., XS = YP ,
XN = YI .
Figure 2 shows the utility-optimized RR with XS = YP =
{x1, x2, x3} and XN = YI = {x4, x5, x6}. The utility-optimized
RR applies the ǫ-RR to XS. It maps x ∈ XN to y ∈ YP
(= XS) with the probability Q(y|x) so that (5) is satisfied,
and maps x ∈ XN to itself with the remaining probabil-
ity. Formally, we define the utility-optimized RR (uRR) as
follows:
Definition 3 ((XS, ǫ)-utility-optimized RR). Let XS ⊆ X
and ǫ ∈ R≥0. Let c1 = eǫ|XS |+eǫ−1 , c2 =
1
|XS |+eǫ−1 , and c3 =
1 − |XS|c2 = eǫ−1|XS |+eǫ−1 . Then the (XS, ǫ)-utility-optimized
RR (uRR) is an obfuscation mechanism that maps x ∈ X
to y ∈ Y (= X ) with the probability QuRR(y|x) defined as
follows:
QuRR(y|x) =


c1 (if x ∈ XS, y = x)
c2 (if x ∈ XS, y ∈ XS \ {x})
c2 (if x ∈ XN , y ∈ XS)
c3 (if x ∈ XN , y = x)
0 (otherwise).
(6)
Proposition 2. The (XS, ǫ)-uRR provides (XS,XS, ǫ)-ULDP.
4.2 Utility-Optimized RAPPOR
Next, we propose the utility-optimized RAPPOR with the
input alphabet X = {x1, x2, · · · , x|X|} and the output al-
phabet Y = {0, 1}|X|. Without loss of generality, we assume
that x1, · · · , x|XS | are sensitive and x|XS|+1, · · · , x|X| are
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Figure 3: Utility-optimized RAPPOR in the case
where XS = {x1, · · · , x4} and XN = {x5, · · · , x10}.
non-sensitive; i.e., XS = {x1, · · · , x|XS|}, XN = {x|XS|+1,· · · , x|X|}.
Figure 3 shows the utility-optimized RAPPOR with XS =
{x1, · · · , x4} and XN = {x5, · · · , x10}. The utility-optimized
RAPPOR first deterministically maps xi ∈ X to the i-th
standard basis vector ei. It should be noted that if xi is
sensitive data (i.e., xi ∈ XS), then the last |XN | elements in
ei are always zero (as shown in the upper-left panel of Fig-
ure 3). Based on this fact, the utility-optimized RAPPOR
regards obfuscated data y = (y1, y2, . . . , y|X|) ∈ {0, 1}|X|
such that y|XS|+1 = · · · = y|X| = 0 as protected data; i.e.,
YP = {(y1, . . . , y|XS|, 0, · · · , 0)|y1, . . . , y|XS | ∈ {0, 1}}. (7)
Then it applies the (θ, ǫ)-generalized RAPPOR to XS , and
maps x ∈ XN to y ∈ YP (as shown in the lower-left panel of
Figure 3) with the probability Q(y|x) so that (5) is satisfied.
We formally define the utility-optimized RAPPOR (uRAP):
Definition 4 ((XS, θ,ǫ)-utility-optimized RAPPOR). Let
XS ⊆ X , θ ∈ [0, 1], and ǫ ∈ R≥0. Let d1 = θ(1−θ)eǫ+θ ,
d2 =
(1−θ)eǫ+θ
eǫ
. Then the (XS, θ,ǫ)-utility-optimized RAP-
POR (uRAP) is an obfuscation mechanism that maps xi ∈
X to y ∈ Y = {0, 1}|X| with the probability QuRAP (y|x)
given by:
QuRAP (y|xi) =∏1≤j≤|X| Pr(yj |xi), (8)
where Pr(yj |xi) is written as follows:
(i) if 1 ≤ j ≤ |XS |:
Pr(yj |xi) =


1− θ (if i = j, yj = 0)
θ (if i = j, yj = 1)
1− d1 (if i 6= j, yj = 0)
d1 (if i 6= j, yj = 1).
(9)
(ii) if |XS|+ 1 ≤ j ≤ |X |:
Pr(yj |xi) =


d2 (if i = j, yj = 0)
1− d2 (if i = j, yj = 1)
1 (if i 6= j, yj = 0)
0 (if i 6= j, yj = 1).
(10)
Proposition 3. The (XS, θ, ǫ)-uRAP provides (XS,YP , ǫ)-
ULDP, where YP is given by (7).
Although we used the generalized RAPPOR in XS and YP
in Definition 4, hereinafter we set θ = e
ǫ/2
eǫ/2+1
in the same
way as the original RAPPOR [23]. There are two reasons for
this. First, it achieves “order” optimal data utility among all
(XS,YP , ǫ)-ULDP mechanisms in the high privacy regime,
as shown in Section 4.3. Second, it maps xi ∈ XN to y ∈
YI with probability 1 − d2 = 1 − e−ǫ/2, which is close to
1 when ǫ is large (i.e., low privacy regime). Wang et al.
[50] showed that the generalized RAPPOR with parameter
θ = 1
2
minimizes the variance of the estimate. However,
our uRAP with parameter θ = 1
2
maps xi ∈ XN to y ∈
YI with probability 1 − d2 = eǫ−12eǫ which is less than 1 −
e−ǫ/2 for any ǫ > 0 and is less than 1
2
even when ǫ goes to
infinity. Thus, our uRAP with θ = e
ǫ/2
eǫ/2+1
maps xi ∈ XN
to y ∈ YI with higher probability, and therefore achieves
a smaller estimation error over all non-sensitive data. We
also consider that an optimal θ for our uRAP is different
from the optimal θ (= 1
2
) for the generalized RAPPOR. We
leave finding the optimal θ for our uRAP (with respect to
the estimation error over all personal data) as future work.
We refer to the (XS, θ, ǫ)-uRAP with θ = eǫ/2
eǫ/2+1
in short-
hand as the (XS, ǫ)-uRAP.
4.3 Utility Analysis
We evaluate the l1 loss of the uRR and uRAP when the
empirical estimation method is used for distribution estima-
tion2. In particular, we evaluate the l1 loss when ǫ is close to
0 (i.e., high privacy regime) and ǫ = ln |X | (i.e., low privacy
regime). Note that ULDP provides a natural interpretation
of the latter value of ǫ. Specifically, it follows from (5) that
if ǫ = ln |X |, then for any x ∈ X , the likelihood that the
input data is x is almost equal to the sum of the likelihood
that the input data is x′ 6= x. This is consistent with the
fact that the ǫ-RR with parameter ǫ = ln |X | sends true data
(i.e., y = x in (2)) with probability about 0.5 and false data
(i.e., y 6= x) with probability about 0.5, and hence provides
plausible deniability [29].
uRR in the general case. We begin with the uRR:
Proposition 4 (l1 loss of the uRR). Let ǫ ∈ R≥0, u =
|XS |+ eǫ − 1, u′ = eǫ − 1, and v = uu′ . Then the expected l1
loss of the (XS, ǫ)-uRR mechanism is given by:
E [l1(pˆ,p)] ≈
√
2
nπ
( ∑
x∈XS
√(
p(x) + 1/u′
)(
v − p(x)− 1/u′)
+
∑
x∈XN
√
p(x)
(
v − p(x))), (11)
where f(n) ≈ g(n) represents limn→∞ f(n)/g(n) = 1.
Let pUN be the uniform distribution over XN ; i.e., for any
x ∈ XS, pUN (x) = 0, and for any x ∈ XN , pUN (x) = 1|XN | .
Symmetrically, let pUS be the uniform distribution over XS.
For 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN |+1), the l1 loss is maximized by pUN :
Proposition 5. For any 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN | + 1) and |XS | ≤
|XN |, (11) is maximized by pUN :
E [l1(pˆ,p)] . E [l1(pˆ,pUN )]
=
√
2
nπ
(
|XS |
√
|XS|+eǫ−2
eǫ−1 +
√
|XS ||XN |
eǫ−1 + |XN | − 1
)
, (12)
2We note that we use the empirical estimation method in
the same way as [29], and that it might be possible that
other mechanisms have better utility with a different esti-
mation method. However, we emphasize that even with the
empirical estimation method, the uRAP achieves the lower
bounds on the l1 and l2 losses of any ULDP mechanisms
when ǫ ≈ 0, and the uRR and uRAP achieve almost the
same utility as a non-private mechanism when ǫ = ln |X |
and most of the data are non-sensitive.
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where f(n) . g(n) represents limn→∞ f(n)/g(n) ≤ 1.
For ǫ ≥ ln(|XN |+1), the l1 loss is maximized by a mixture
distribution of pUN and pUS :
Proposition 6. Let p∗ be a distribution over X defined by:
p∗(x) =


1−|XN |/(eǫ−1)
|XS |+|XN | (if x ∈ XS)
1+|XS |/(eǫ−1)
|XS |+|XN | (otherwise)
(13)
Then for any ǫ ≥ ln(|XN |+ 1), (11) is maximized by p∗:
E [l1(pˆ,p)] . E [l1(pˆ,p
∗)] =
√
2(|X|−1)
nπ
· |XS |+eǫ−1
eǫ−1 , (14)
where f(n) . g(n) represents limn→∞ f(n)/g(n) ≤ 1.
Next, we instantiate the l1 loss in the high and low privacy
regimes based on these propositions.
uRR in the high privacy regime. When ǫ is close to
0, we have eǫ − 1 ≈ ǫ. Thus, the right-hand side of (12) in
Proposition 5 can be simplified as follows:
E [l1(pˆ,pUN )] ≈
√
2
nπ
· |XS |
√
|XS|−1
ǫ
. (15)
It was shown in [29] that the expected l1 loss of the ǫ-RR is
at most
√
2
nπ
|X|
√
|X|−1
ǫ
when ǫ ≈ 0. The right-hand side of
(15) is much smaller than this when |XS | ≪ |X |. Although
both of them are “upper-bounds” of the expected l1 losses,
we show that the total variation of the (XS , ǫ)-uRR is also
much smaller than that of the ǫ-RR when |XS| ≪ |X | in
Section 6.
uRR in the low privacy regime. When ǫ = ln |X | and
|XS | ≪ |X |, the right-hand side of (14) in Proposition 6 can
be simplified by using |XS|/|X | ≈ 0:
E [l1(pˆ,p
∗)] ≈
√
2(|X|−1)
nπ
.
It should be noted that the expected l1 loss of the non-
private mechanism, which does not obfuscate the personal
data at all, is at most
√
2(|X|−1)
nπ
[29]. Thus, when ǫ =
ln |X | and |XS| ≪ |X |, the (XS, ǫ)-uRR achieves almost the
same data utility as the non-private mechanism, whereas the
expected l1 loss of the ǫ-RR is twice larger than that of the
non-private mechanism [29].
uRAP in the general case. We then analyze the uRAP:
Proposition 7 (l1 loss of the uRAP). Let ǫ ∈ R≥0, u′ =
eǫ/2 − 1, and vN = eǫ/2
eǫ/2−1 . The expected l1-loss of the
(XS, ǫ)-uRAP mechanism is:
E [l1(pˆ,p)] ≈
√
2
nπ
(|XS|∑
j=1
√(
p(xj) + 1/u′
)(
vN − p(xj)
)
+
|X|∑
j=|XS|+1
√
p(xj)
(
vN − p(xj)
))
, (16)
where f(n) ≈ g(n) represents limn→∞ f(n)/g(n) = 1.
When 0 < ǫ < 2 ln( |XN |
2
+ 1), the l1 loss is maximized by
the uniform distribution pUN over XN :
Proposition 8. For any 0 < ǫ < 2 ln( |XN |
2
+1) and |XS| ≤
|XN |, (16) is maximized when p = pUN :
E [l1(pˆ,p)] . E [l1(pˆ,pUN )]
=
√
2
nπ
(
eǫ/4|XS |
eǫ/2−1 +
√
eǫ/2|XN |
eǫ/2−1 − 1
)
, (17)
where f(n) . g(n) represents limn→∞ f(n)/g(n) ≤ 1.
Note that this proposition covers a wide range of ǫ. For
example, when |XS| ≤ |XN |, it covers both the high privacy
regime (ǫ ≈ 0) and low privacy regime (ǫ = ln |X |), since
ln |X | < 2 ln( |XN |
2
+ 1). Below we instantiate the l1 loss in
the high and low privacy regimes based on this proposition.
uRAP in the high privacy regime. If ǫ is close to 0,
we have eǫ/2 − 1 ≈ ǫ/2. Thus, the right-hand side of (17) in
Proposition 8 can be simplified as follows:
E [l1(pˆ,pUN )] ≈
√
2
nπ
· 2|XS |
ǫ
. (18)
It is shown in [29] that the expected l1 loss of the ǫ-RAPPOR
is at most
√
2
nπ
· 2|X|
ǫ
when ǫ ≈ 0. Thus, by (18), the
expected l1 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-uRAP is much smaller than
that of the ǫ-RAPPOR when |XS | ≪ |X |.
Moreover, by (18), the expected l1 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-
uRAP in the worst case is expressed as Θ( |XS |√
nǫ2
) in the high
privacy regime. As described in Section 3.2, this is “order”
optimal among all (XS,YP , ǫ)-ULDP mechanisms (in Ap-
pendix E, we also show that the expected l2 of the (XS, ǫ)-
uRAP is expressed as Θ( |XS|
nǫ2
)).
uRAP in the low privacy regime. If ǫ = ln |X | and
|XS | ≪ |X | 34 , the right-hand side of (17) can be simplified,
using |XS |/|X | 34 ≈ 0, as follows:
E [l1(pˆ,pUN )] ≈
√
2(|X|−1)
nπ
.
Thus, when ǫ = ln |X | and |XS | ≪ |X | 34 , the (XS, ǫ)-uRAP
also achieves almost the same data utility as the non-private
mechanism, whereas the expected l1 loss of the ǫ-RAPPOR
is
√|X | times larger than that of the non-private mechanism
[29].
Summary. In summary, the uRR and uRAP provide much
higher utility than the RR and RAPPOR when |XS| ≪ |X |.
Moreover, when ǫ = ln |X | and |XS | ≪ |X | (resp. |XS | ≪
|X | 34 ), the uRR (resp. uRAP) achieves almost the same util-
ity as a non-private mechanism.
5. PERSONALIZED ULDP MECHANISMS
We now consider the personalized-mechanism scenario (out-
lined in Section 2.1), and propose a PUM (Personalized
ULDP Mechanism) to keep secret what is sensitive for each
user while enabling the data collector to estimate a distri-
bution.
Sections 5.1 describes the PUM. Section 5.2 explains its
privacy properties. Section 5.3 proposes a method to esti-
mate the distribution p from Y obfuscated using the PUM.
Section 5.4 analyzes the data utility of the PUM.
5.1 PUM with κ Semantic Tags
Figure 4 shows the overview of the PUM Q(i) for the i-th
user (i = 1, 2, . . . , n). It first deterministically maps per-
sonal data x ∈ X to intermediate data using a pre-processor
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Figure 4: Overview of the PUM Q(i) (= Qcmn ◦ f (i)pre).
f
(i)
pre, and then maps the intermediate data to obfuscated
data y ∈ Y using a utility-optimized mechanism Qcmn com-
mon to all users. The pre-processor f
(i)
pre maps user-specific
sensitive data x ∈ X (i)S to one of κ bots: ⊥1,⊥2, · · · , or ⊥κ.
The κ bots represent user-specific sensitive data, and each
of them is associated with a semantic tag such as “home” or
“workplace”. The κ semantic tags are the same for all users,
and are useful when the data collector has some background
knowledge about p conditioned on each tag. For example,
a distribution of POIs tagged as “home” or “workplace”
can be easily obtained via the Fousquare venue API [54].
Although this is not a user distribution but a “POI distri-
bution”, it can be used to roughly approximate the distri-
bution of users tagged as “home” or “workplace”, as shown
in Section 6. We define a set Z of intermediate data by
Z = X ∪{⊥1, · · · ,⊥κ}, and a set ZS of sensitive intermedi-
ate data by ZS = XS ∪ {⊥1, · · · ,⊥κ}.
Formally, the PUMQ(i) first maps personal data x ∈ X to
intermediate data z ∈ Z using a pre-processor f (i)pre : X → Z
specific to each user. The pre-processor f
(i)
pre maps sensitive
data x ∈ X (i)S associated with the k-th tag (1 ≤ k ≤ κ) to the
corresponding bot ⊥k, and maps other data to themselves.
Let X (i)S,k be a set of the i-th user’s sensitive data associated
with the k-th tag (e.g., set of regions including her primary
home and second home). Then, X (i)S is expressed as X (i)S =⋃
1≤k≤κ X (i)S,k, and f (i)pre is given by:
f (i)pre(x) =
{
⊥k (if x ∈ X (i)S,k)
x (otherwise).
(19)
After mapping personal data x ∈ X to intermediate data
z ∈ Z, the (ZS ,YP , ǫ)-utility-optimized mechanism Qcmn
maps z to obfuscated data y ∈ Y. Examples of Qcmn in-
clude the (ZS , ǫ)-uRR (in Definition 3) and (ZS , ǫ)-uRAP
(in Definition 4). As a whole, the PUM Q(i) can be ex-
pressed as: Q(i) = Qcmn◦f (i)pre. The i-th user stores f (i)pre and
Qcmn in a device that obfuscates her personal data (e.g., mo-
bile phone, personal computer). Note that if f
(i)
pre is leaked,
x ∈ XN corresponding to each bot (e.g., home, workplace)
is leaked. Thus, the user keeps f
(i)
pre secret. To strongly pre-
vent the leakage of f
(i)
pre, the user may deal with f
(i)
pre using
a tamper-resistant hardware/software. On the other hand,
the utility-optimized mechanism Qcmn, which is common to
all users, is available to the data collector.
The feature of the proposed PUM Q(i) is two-fold: (i)
the secrecy of the pre-processor f
(i)
pre and (ii) the κ semantic
tags. By the first feature, the i-th user can keep X (i)S (i.e.,
what is sensitive for her) secret, as shown in Section 5.2.
The second feature enables the data collector to estimate a
distribution p with high accuracy. Specifically, she estimates
p from obfuscated dataY usingQcmn and some background
knowledge about p conditioned on each tag, as shown in
Section 5.3.
In practice, it may happen that a user has her specific sen-
sitive data x ∈ X (i)S that is not associated with any semantic
tags. For example, if we prepare only tags named “home”
and “workplace”, then sightseeing places, restaurants, and
any other places are not associated with these tags. One
way to deal with such data is to create another bot asso-
ciated with a tag named “others” (e.g., if ⊥1 and ⊥2 are
associated with “home” and “workplace”, respectively, we
create ⊥3 associated with “others”), and map x to this bot.
It would be difficult for the data collector to obtain back-
ground knowledge about p conditioned on such a tag. In
Section 5.3, we will explain how to estimate p in this case.
5.2 Privacy Properties
We analyze the privacy properties of the PUMQ(i). First,
we show that it provides ULDP.
Proposition 9. The PUM Q(i) (= Qcmn ◦ f (i)pre) provides
(XS ∪ X (i)S , YP , ǫ)-ULDP.
We also show that our PUM provides DP in that an ad-
versary who has observed y ∈ YP cannot determine, for any
i, j ∈ [n], whether it is obfuscated using Q(i) or Q(j), which
means that y ∈ YP reveals almost no information about
X (i)S :
Proposition 10. For any i, j ∈ [n], any x ∈ X , and any
y ∈ YP ,
Q(i)(y|x) ≤ eǫQ(j)(y|x).
We then analyze the secrecy of X (i)S . The data collector,
who knows the common-mechanism Qcmn, cannot obtain
any information about X (i)S from Qcmn and y ∈ YP . Specif-
ically, the data collector knows, for each z ∈ Z, whether
z ∈ ZS or not by viewing Qcmn. However, she cannot ob-
tain any information about X (i)S from ZS , because she does
not know the mapping between X (i)S and {⊥1, · · · ,⊥κ} (i.e.,
f
(i)
pre). In addition, Propositions 9 and 10 guarantee that
y ∈ YP reveals almost no information about both input
data and X (i)S .
For example, assume that the i-th user obfuscates her
home x ∈ XS ∪ X (i)S using the PUM Q(i), and sends y ∈
YP to the data collector. The data collector cannot infer
either x ∈ XS ∪ X (i)S or z ∈ ZS from y ∈ YP , since both
Qcmn and Q
(i) provide ULDP. This means that the data
collector cannot infer the fact that she was at home from y.
Furthermore, the data collector cannot infer where her home
is, since X (i)S cannot be inferred from Qcmn and y ∈ YP as
explained above.
We need to take a little care when the i-th user obfus-
cates non-sensitive data x ∈ XN \ X (i)S using Q(i) and sends
y ∈ YI to the data collector. In this case, the data collector
learns x from y, and therefore learns that x is not sensitive
(i.e., x /∈ X (i)S ). Thus, the data collector, who knows that
the user wants to hide her home, would reduce the num-
ber of possible candidates for her home from X to X \ {x}.
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However, if |X | is large (e.g., |X | = 625 in our experiments
using location data), the number |X | − 1 of candidates is
still large. Since the data collector cannot further reduce
the number of candidates using Qcmn, her home is still kept
strongly secret. In Section 7, we also explain that the se-
crecy of X (i)S is achieved under reasonable assumptions even
when she sends multiple data.
5.3 Distribution Estimation
We now explain how to estimate a distribution p from
data Y obfuscated using the PUM. Let r(i) be a distribution
of intermediate data for the i-th user:
r(i)(z) =


∑
x∈X (i)
S,k
p(x) (if z = ⊥k for some k = 1, . . . , κ)
0 (if z ∈ X (i)S )
p(z) (otherwise).
and r be the average of r(i) over n users; i.e., r(z) = 1
n∑n
i=1 r
(i)(z) for any z ∈ Z. Note that ∑x∈X p(x) = 1 and∑
z∈Z r(z) = 1. Furthermore, let πk be a distribution of
personal data x ∈ X conditioned on ⊥k defined by:
πk(x) =
∑n
i=1 p
(i)
k (x)∑
x′∈X
∑n
i=1 p
(i)
k (x
′)
, (20)
p
(i)
k (x) =
{
p(x) (if f
(i)
pre(x) = ⊥k)
0 (otherwise).
πk(x) in (20) is a normalized sum of the probability p(x) of
personal data x whose corresponding intermediate data is
⊥k. Note that although x ∈ X is deterministically mapped
to z ∈ Z for each user, we can consider the probability
distribution πk for n users. For example, if ⊥k is tagged as
“home”, then πk is a distribution of users at home.
We propose a method to estimate a distribution p from
obfuscated data Y using some background knowledge about
πk as an estimate πˆk of πk (we explain the case where
we have no background knowledge later). Our estimation
method first estimates a distribution r of intermediate data
from obfuscated dataY usingQcmn. This can be performed
in the same way as the common-mechanism scenario. Let rˆ
be the estimate of r.
After computing rˆ, our method estimates p using the es-
timate πˆk (i.e., background knowledge about πk) as follows:
pˆ(x) = rˆ(x) +
κ∑
k=1
rˆ(⊥k)πˆk(x), ∀x ∈ X . (21)
Note that pˆ in (21) can be regarded as an empirical estimate
of p. Moreover, if both rˆ and πˆk are in the probability
simplex C, then pˆ in (21) is always in C.
If we do not have estimates πˆk for some bots (like the one
tagged as “others” in Section 5.1), then we set πˆk(x) in pro-
portion to rˆ(x) over x ∈ XN (i.e., πˆk(x) = rˆ(x)∑
x′∈XN
rˆ(x′)
) for
such bots. When we do not have any background knowledge
πˆ1, · · · , πˆκ for all bots, it amounts to simply discarding the
estimates rˆ(⊥1), · · · , rˆ(⊥κ) for κ bots and normalizing rˆ(x)
over x ∈ XN so that the sum is one.
5.4 Utility Analysis
We now theoretically analyze the data utility of our PUM.
Recall that pˆ, rˆ, and πˆk are the estimate of the distribution
of personal data, intermediate data, and personal data con-
ditioned on ⊥k, respectively. In the following, we show that
the l1 loss of pˆ can be upper-bounded as follows:
Theorem 1 (l1 loss of the PUM).
l1(pˆ,p) ≤ l1(rˆ, r) +
κ∑
k=1
rˆ(⊥k)l1(πˆk, πk). (22)
This means the upper-bound on the l1 loss of pˆ can be
decomposed into the l1 loss of rˆ and of πˆk weighted by rˆ(⊥k).
The first term in (22) is the l1 loss of rˆ, which depends on
Qcmn. For example, if we use the uRR or uRAP as Qcmn,
the expectation of l1(rˆ, r) is given by Propositions 4 and 7,
respectively. In Section 6, we show they are very small.
The second term in (22) is the summation of the l1 loss
of πˆk weighted by rˆ(⊥k). If we accurately estimate πk, the
second term is very small. In other words, if we have enough
background knowledge about πk, we can accurately estimate
p in the personalized-mechanism scenario.
It should be noted that when the probability rˆ(⊥k) is
small, the second term in (22) is small even if we have no
background knowledge about πk. For example, when only a
small number of users map x ∈ X (i)S to a tag named “others”,
they hardly affect the accuracy of pˆ. Moreover, the second
term in (22) is upper-bounded by 2
∑κ
k=1 rˆ(⊥k), since the l1
loss is at most 2. Thus, after computing rˆ, the data collector
can easily compute the worst-case value of the second term
in (22) to know the effect of the estimation error of πˆk on
the accuracy of pˆ.
Last but not least, the second term in (22) does not de-
pend on ǫ (while the first term depends on ǫ). Thus, the
effect of the second term is relatively small when ǫ is small
(i.e., high privacy regime), as shown in Section 6.
Remark. Note that different privacy preferences might
skew the distribution πk. For example, doctors might not
consider hospitals as sensitive as compared to patients. Con-
sequently, the distribution πk conditioned on “hospital” might
be a distribution of patients (not doctors) in hospitals. This
kind of systematic bias can increase the estimation error of
πˆk. Theorem 1 and the above discussions are also valid in
this case.
6. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
6.1 Experimental Set-up
We conducted experiments using two large-scale datasets:
Foursquare dataset. The Foursquare dataset (global-scale
check-in dataset) [54] is one of the largest location datasets
among publicly available datasets (e.g., see [10], [43], [55],
[57]); it contains 33278683 check-ins all over the world, each
of which is associated with a POI ID and venue category
(e.g., restaurant, shop, hotel, hospital, home, workplace).
We used 359054 check-ins in Manhattan, assuming that
each check-in is from a different user. Then we divided Man-
hattan into 25×25 regions at regular intervals and used them
as input alphabets; i.e., |X | = 625. The size of each region
is about 400m (horizontal) × 450m (vertical). We assumed
a region that includes a hospital visited by at least ten users
as a sensitive region common to all users. The number of
such regions was |XS| = 15. In addition, we assumed a re-
gion in XN that includes a user’s home or workplace as her
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user-specific sensitive region. The number of users at home
and workplace was 5040 and 19532, respectively.
US Census dataset. The US Census (1990) dataset [35]
was collected as part of the 1990 U.S. census. It contains
responses from 2458285 people (each person provides one
response), each of which contains 68 attributes.
We used the responses from all people, and used age, in-
come, marital status, and sex as attributes. Each attribute
has 8, 5, 5, and 2 categories, respectively. (See [35] for de-
tails about the value of each category ID.) We regarded a
tuple of the category IDs as a total category ID, and used
it as an input alphabet; i.e., |X | = 400 (= 8 × 5 × 5 × 2).
We considered the fact that “divorce” and “unemployment”
might be sensitive for many users [34], and regarded such
categories as sensitive for all users (to be on the safe side,
as described in Section 2.1). Note that people might be stu-
dents until their twenties and might retire in their fifties or
sixties. Children of age twelve and under cannot get mar-
ried. We excluded such categories from sensitive ones. The
number of sensitive categories was |XS| = 76.
We used a frequency distribution of all people as a true
distribution p, and randomly chose a half of all people as
users who provide their obfuscated data; i.e., n = 179527
and 1229143 in the Foursquare and US Census datasets,
respectively. Here we did not use all people, because we
would like to evaluate the non-private mechanism that does
not obfuscate the personal data; i.e., the non-private mech-
anism has an estimation error in our experiments due to the
random sampling from the population.
As utility, we evaluated the TV (Total Variation) by com-
puting the sample mean over a hundred realizations of Y.
6.2 Experimental Results
Common-mechanism scenario. We first focused on the
common-mechanism scenario, and evaluated the RR, RAP-
POR, uRR, and uRAP. As distribution estimation methods,
we used empirical estimation, empirical estimation with the
significance threshold, and EM reconstruction (denoted by
“emp”, “emp+thr”, and “EM”, respectively). In “emp+thr”,
we set the significance level α to be α = 0.05, and uniformly
assigned the remaining probability to each of the estimates
below the significance threshold in the same way as [50].
Figure 5 shows the results in the case where ǫ is changed
from 0.1 to 10. “no privacy” represents the non-private
mechanism. It can be seen that our mechanisms outperform
the existing mechanisms by one or two orders of magnitude.
Our mechanisms are effective especially in the Foursquare
dataset, since the proportion of sensitive regions is very
small (15/625 = 0.024). Moreover, the uRR provides almost
the same performance as the non-private mechanism when
ǫ = ln |X |, as described in Section 4.3. It can also be seen
that “emp+thr” and “EM” significantly outperform “emp”,
since the estimates in “emp+thr” and “EM” are always non-
negative. Although “EM” outperforms “emp+thr” for the
RAPPOR and uRAP when ǫ was large, the two estimation
methods provide very close performance as a whole.
We then evaluated the relationship between the number
of sensitive regions/categories and the TV. To this end, we
randomly chose XS from X , and increased |XS | from 1 to
|X | (only in this experiment). We attempted one hundred
cases for randomly choosing XS from X , and evaluated the
TV by computing the sample mean over one hundred cases.
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Figure 5: ǫ vs. TV (common-mechanism). A bold
line parallel to the y-axis represents ǫ = ln |X |.
Figure 6 shows the results for ǫ = 0.1 (high privacy regime)
or ln |X | (low privacy regime). Here we omit the perfor-
mance of “emp+thr”, since it is very close to that of “EM”
in the same way as in Figure 5. The uRAP and uRR provide
the best performance when ǫ = 0.1 and ln |X |, respectively.
In addition, the uRR provides the performance close to the
non-private mechanism when ǫ = ln |X | and the number |XS|
of sensitive regions/categories is less than 100. The perfor-
mance of the uRAP is also close to that of the non-private
mechanism when |XS | is less than 20 (note that |X | 34 = 125
and 89 in the Foursquare and US Census datasets, respec-
tively). However, it rapidly increases with increase in |XS |.
Overall, our theoretical results in Section 4.3 hold for the
two real datasets.
We also evaluated the performance when the number of
attributes was increased from 4 to 9 in the US Census dataset.
We added, one by one, five attributes as to whether or not a
user has served in the military during five periods (“Sept80”,
“May75880”, “Vietnam”, “Feb55”, and “Korean” in [18]; we
added them in this order). We assumed that these attributes
are non-sensitive. Since each of the five attributes had two
categories (1: yes, 0: no), |X | (resp. |XS|) was changed from
400 to 12800 (resp. from 76 to 2432). We randomly chose
n = 240000 people as users who provide obfuscated data,
and evaluated the TV by computing the sample mean over
ten realizations of Y (only in this experiment).
Figure 7 shows the results in the case where ǫ = 0.1, 1.0, or
6.0 (=ln 400). Here we omit the performance of “emp+thr”
in the same way as Figure 6. Although the TV increases
with an increase in the number of attributes, overall our
utility-optimized mechanisms remain effective, compared to
the existing mechanisms. One exception is the case where
ǫ = 0.1 and the number of attributes is 9; the TV of the RR
(EM), RAPPOR (EM), and uRR (EM) is almost 1. Note
that when we use the EM reconstruction method, the worst
value of the TV is 1. Thus, as with the RR and RAPPOR,
the uRR fails to estimate a distribution in this case. On the
other hand, the TV of the uRAP (EM) is much smaller than
1 even in this case, which is consistent with the fact that the
uRAP is order optimal in the high privacy regime. Overall,
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Figure 6: |XS | vs. TV when ǫ = 0.1 or ln |X |.
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Figure 7: Number of attributes vs. TV (US Census
dataset; left: ǫ = 0.1, middle: ǫ = 1.0, right: ǫ = 6.0).
the uRAP is robust to the increase of the attributes at the
same value of ǫ (note that for large |X |, ǫ = 1.0 or 6.0 is a
medium privacy regime where 0≪ ǫ≪ ln |X |).
We also measured the running time (i.e., time to estimate
p from Y) of “EM” (which sets the estimate by “emp+thr”
as an initial value of pˆ) on an Intel Xeon CPU E5-2620
v3 (2.40 GHz, 6 cores, 12 logical processors) with 32 GB
RAM. We found that the running time increases roughly
linearly with the number of attributes. For example, when
ǫ = 6.0 and the number of attributes is 9, the running time
of “EM” required 3121, 1258, 5225, and 1073 seconds for
“RR”, “uRR”, “RAP”, and “uRAP”, respectively. We also
measured the running time of ‘emp” and “emp+thr”, and
found that they required less than one second even when the
number of attributes is 9. Thus, if “EM” requires too much
time for a large number of attributes, “emp+thr” would be
a good alternative to “EM”.
Personalized-mechanism scenario. We then focused
on the personalized-mechanism scenario, and evaluated our
utility-optimized mechanisms using the Foursquare dataset.
We used the PUM with κ = 2 semantic tags (described
in Section 5.1), which maps “home” and ‘workplace” to
bots ⊥1 and ⊥2, respectively. As the background knowl-
edge about the bot distribution πk (1 ≤ k ≤ 2), we consid-
ered three cases: (I) we do not have any background knowl-
edge; (II) we use a distribution of POIs tagged as “home”
(resp. “workplace”), which is computed from the POI data
in [54], as an estimate of the bot probability πˆ1 (resp. πˆ2);
(III) we use the true distributions (i.e., πˆk = πk). Regard-
ing (II), we emphasize again that it is not a user distribution
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Figure 8: ǫ vs. TV (personalized-mechanism) ((I):
w/o knowledge, (II): POI distribution, (III): true
distribution).
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Figure 9: Visualization of the distributions ((II):
POI distribution, (III): true distribution).
Table 1: l1 loss l1(pˆ,p) and the first and second terms
in the right-hand side of (22) in the case where ǫ =
ln |X | and the EM reconstruction method is used.
Method l1(pˆ,p) first term second term
uRR (I) 6.73× 10−2 2.70 × 10−2 7.34 × 10−2
uRR (II) 4.24× 10−2 2.70 × 10−2 2.96 × 10−2
uRR (III) 2.62× 10−2 2.70 × 10−2 0
uRAP (I) 6.77× 10−2 2.76 × 10−2 7.35 × 10−2
uRAP (II) 4.28× 10−2 2.76 × 10−2 2.96 × 10−2
uRAP (III) 2.67× 10−2 2.76 × 10−2 0
but a “POI distribution”, and can be easily obtained via the
Foursquare venue API [54].
Figure 8 shows the results. We also show the POI and
true distributions in Figure 9. It can be seen that the per-
formance of (II) lies in between that of (I) and (III), which
shows that the estimate πˆk of the bot distribution affects
utility. However, when ǫ is smaller than 1, all of (I), (II),
and (III) provide almost the same performance, since the
effect of the estimation error of πˆk does not depend on ǫ, as
described in Section 5.4.
We also computed the l1 loss l1(pˆ,p) and the first and
second terms in the right-hand side of (22) to investigate
whether Theorem 1 holds. Table 1 shows the results (we
averaged the values over one hundred realizations of Y). It
can be seen that l1(pˆ,p) is smaller than the summation of
the first and second terms in all of the methods, which shows
that Theorem 1 holds in our experiments.
From these experimental results, we conclude that our
proposed methods are very effective in both the common-
mechanism and personalized-mechanism scenarios. In Ap-
pendix E.3, we show the MSE has similar results to the TV.
7. DISCUSSIONS
On the case of multiple data per user. We have so far
assumed that each user sends only a single datum. Now we
discuss the case where each user sends multiple data based
on the compositionality of ULDP described in Section 3.2.
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Specifically, when a user sends t (> 1) data, we obtain
(XS, (YP )t, ǫ)-ULDP in total by obfuscating each data using
the (XS,YP , ǫ/t)-utility-optimized mechanism. Note, how-
ever, that the amount of noise added to each data increases
with increase in t. Consequently, for ǫ ∈ [0, t], the lower
bound on the l1 (resp. l2) loss (described in Section 3.2) can
be expressed as Θ(
√
t|XS |√
nǫ2
) (resp. Θ( t|XS|
nǫ2
)), which increases
with increase in t. Thus, t cannot be large for distribu-
tion estimation in practice. This is also common to all LDP
mechanisms.
Next we discuss the secrecy of X (i)S . Assume that the i-th
user obfuscates t data using different seeds, and sends tP
protected data in YP and tI invertible data in YI , where
t = tP + tI > 1 (she can also use the same seed for the same
data to reduce tI as in [23]). If all the tI data in YI are
different from each other, the data collector learns tI original
data in XN . However, tI (≤ t) cannot be large in practice,
as explained above. In addition, in many applications, a
user’s personal data is highly non-uniform and sparse. In
locations data, for example, a user often visits only a small
number of regions in the whole map X . Let T (i) ⊆ XN be
a set of possible input values for the i-th user in XN . Then,
even if tI is large, the data collector cannot learn more than
|T (i)| data in XN .
Moreover, the tP data in YP reveal almost no information
about X (i)S , since Q(i) provides (XS , (YP )t, ǫ)-ULDP. Qcmn
provides no information about X (i)S , since f (i)pre is kept secret.
Thus, the data collector, who knows that the user wants to
hide her home, cannot reduce the number of candidates for
her home from max{|X |− tI , |X |− |T (i)|} using the tP data
and Qcmn. If either tI or |T (i)| is much smaller than |X |,
her home is kept strongly secret.
Note that p can be estimated even if X (i)S changes over
time. X (i)S is also kept strongly secret if tI or |T (i)| is small.
On the correlation between XS and XN . It should also
be noted that there might be a correlation between sensitive
data XS and non-sensitive data XN . For example, if a user
discloses a non-sensitive region close to a sensitive region
including her home, the adversary might infer approximate
information about the original location (e.g., the fact that
the user lives in Paris). However, we emphasize that if the
size of each region is large, the adversary cannot infer the
exact location such as the exact home address. Similar ap-
proaches can be seen in a state-of-the-art location privacy
measure called geo-indistinguishability [4, 7, 41, 46]. Andre´s
et al. [4] considered privacy protection within a radius of
200m from the original location, whereas the size of each
region in our experiments was about 400m × 450m (as de-
scribed in Section 6.1). We can protect the exact location by
setting the size of each region to be large enough, or setting
all regions close to a user’s sensitive location to be sensitive.
There might also be a correlation between two attributes
(e.g., income and marital status) in the US Census dataset.
However, we combined the four category IDs into a total
category ID for each user as described in Section 6.1. Thus,
there is only “one” category ID for each user. Assuming
that each user’s data is independent, there is no correlation
between data. Therefore, we conclude that the sensitive
data are strongly protected in both the Foursquare and US
Census datasets in our experiments.
It should be noted, however, that the number of total
category IDs increases exponentially with the number of at-
tributes. Thus, when there are many attributes as in Fig-
ure 7, the estimation accuracy might be increased by ob-
fuscating each attribute independently (rather than obfus-
cating a total ID) while considering the correlation among
attributes. We also need to consider a correlation among
“users” for some types of personal data (e.g., flu status). For
rigorously protecting such correlated data, we should incor-
porate Pufferfish privacy [32, 47] into ULDP, as described
in Section 1.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced the notion of ULDP that
guarantees privacy equivalent to LDP for only sensitive data.
We proposed ULDP mechanisms in both the common and
personalized mechanism scenarios. We evaluated the util-
ity of our mechanisms theoretically and demonstrated the
effectiveness of our mechanisms through experiments.
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APPENDIX
A. NOTATIONS
We show the basic notations used throughout this paper
in Table 2.
B. PROPERTIES OF ULDP
In this section we present basic properties of ULDP: adap-
tive sequential composition, post-processing, and the com-
patibility with LDP. We also prove that the utility-optimized
RR and the utility-optimized RAPPOR provide ULDP.
B.1 Sequential Composition
Below we prove that ULDP provides the compositionality.
Proposition 1 (Sequential composition). Let ε0, ε1 ≥ 0. If
Q0 provides (XS,Y0P , ε0)-ULDP and Q1(y0) provides (XS,
Y1P , ε1)-ULDP for each y0 ∈ Y0, then the sequential com-
position of Q0 and Q1 provides (XS, (Y0 × Y1)P , ε0 + ε1)-
ULDP.
Proof. Let Y0I = Y \Y0P and Y1I = Y \ Y1P . Let Q be the
sequential composition of Q0 and Q1; i.e.,
Q((y0, y1)|x) = Q0(y0|x)Q1(y1|(y0, x)).
We first show that Q satisfies the first condition (4) in
Definition 2. Let (Y0 ×Y1)I = Y0 ×Y1 \ (Y0 ×Y1)P , which
can be expressed as follows:
(Y0 × Y1)I = {(y0, y1) ∈ Y0 × Y1 | y0 ∈ Y0I or y1 ∈ Y1I} .
If either y0 ∈ Y0I or y1 ∈ Y1I , then it reveals the corre-
sponding input x ∈ XN ; i.e., if y0 ∈ Y0I , then there exists
an x ∈ XN such that Q0(y0|x) > 0 and Q0(y0|x′) = 0
for any x′ 6= x; if y0 ∈ Y1I , then there exists an x ∈ XN
such that Q1(y1|(y0, x)) > 0 and Q1(y1|(y0, x′)) = 0 for any
x′ 6= x. Thus, for any (y0, y1) ∈ (Y0 × Y1)I , there exists an
x ∈ XN such that Q((y0, y1)|x) > 0 and Q((y0, y1)|x′) = 0
for any x′ 6= x.
Next we show that Q satisfies the second condition (5).
Let x, x′ ∈ X and (y0, y1) ∈ (Y0×Y1)P . Then y0 ∈ YP0 and
y1 ∈ YP1. Hence we obtain:
Q((y0, y1)|x)
= Q0(y0|x)Q1(y1|(y0, x))
≤ eǫ0Q0(y0|x′)Q1(y1|(y0, x)) (by y0 ∈ Y0P )
≤ eǫ0Q0(y0|x′)eǫ1Q1(y1|(y0, x′)) (by y1 ∈ Y1P )
= eǫ0+ǫ1Q((y0, y1)|x′).
B.2 Post-processing
We first define a class of post-processing randomized al-
gorithms that preserve data types:
Definition 5 (Preservation of data types). Let YP and ZP
be sets of protected data, and YI and ZI be sets of invertible
data. Given a randomized algorithm Q1 from YP ∪ YI to
ZP ∪ZI , we say that Q1 preserves data types if it satisfies:
• for any z ∈ ZP and any y ∈ YI , Q1(z|y) = 0, and
• for any z ∈ ZI , there exists a y ∈ YI such that Q1(z|y) >
0 and Q1(z|y′) = 0 for any y′ 6= y.
Then we show that ULDP is immune to the post-processing
by this class of randomized algorithms.
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Table 2: Basic notations used in this paper.
Symbol Description
n Number of users.
X Set of personal data.
Y Set of obfuscated data.
XS Set of sensitive data common to all users.
XN Set of the remaining personal data (= X \ XS).
X (i)S Set of sensitive data specific to the i-th user.
X(i) Personal data of the i-th user.
Y (i) Obfuscated data of the i-th user.
X Tuple of all personal data.
Y Tuple of all obfuscated data.
Q(i) Obfuscation mechanism of the i-th user.
p Distribution of the personal data.
pˆ Estimate of p.
C Probability simplex.
Proposition 11 (Post-processing). Let ε ≥ 0. Let ZP and
ZI be sets of protected and invertible data respectively, and
Z = ZP∪ZI . Let Q1 be a randomized algorithm from Y to Z
that preserves data types. If an obfuscation mechanism Q0
from X to Y provides (XS,YP , ε)-ULDP then the composite
function Q1 ◦Q0 provides (XS,ZP , ε)-ULDP.
Proof. We first show that Q satisfies the first condition (4)
in Definition 2. Let z ∈ ZI . Since Q1 preserves data types,
there exists a y ∈ YI such thatQ1(z|y) > 0 andQ1(z|y′) = 0
for any y′ 6= y. In addition, since Q0 provides (XS,YP , ε)-
ULDP, there exists an x ∈ XN such that Q0(y|x) > 0 and
Q0(y|x′) = 0 for any x′ 6= x. Hence we obtain:
(Q1 ◦Q0)(z|x) = Q0(y|x)Q1(z|y) > 0
and for any x′ 6= x,
(Q1 ◦Q0)(z|x′) = Q0(y|x′)Q1(z|y) +
∑
y′ 6=y
Q0(y
′|x′)Q1(z|y′)
= 0.
Next we show that Q satisfies the second condition (5).
Let x, x′ ∈ X and z ∈ ZP . Since Q1 preserves data types,
Q1(z|y) = 0 holds for all y ∈ YI . Then we obtain:
(Q1 ◦Q0)(z|x)
=
∑
y∈YP
Q0(y|x)Q1(z|y)
≤
∑
y∈YP
eεQ0(y|x′)Q1(z|y) (by Q0’s (XS,YP , ε)-ULDP)
= eε(Q1 ◦Q0)(z|x′).
Therefore Q1 ◦Q0 provides (XS,ZP , ε)-ULDP.
For example, ULDP is immune to data cleaning opera-
tions (e.g., transforming values, merging disparate values)
[33] as long as they are represented as Q1 explained above.
Note that Q1 needs to preserve data types for utility (i.e.,
to make all y ∈ YI invertible, as in Definition 2, after post-
processing), and the DP guarantee for y ∈ YP is preserved
by any post-processing algorithm. Specifically, by (5), for
any randomized post-processing algorithm Q∗1, any obfus-
cated data z ∈ Z obtained from y ∈ YP via Q∗1, and any
x, x′ ∈ X , we have: Pr(z|x) ≤ eǫ Pr(z|x′).
B.3 Compatibility with LDP
Assume that data collectors A and B adopt a mechanism
QA providing (XS,YP , ǫA)-ULDP and a mechanismQB pro-
viding ǫB-LDP, respectively. In this case, all protected data
in the data collector A can be combined with all obfuscated
data in the data collector B (i.e., data integration) to per-
form data analysis under LDP. More specifically, assume
that Alice transforms her sensitive personal data in XS into
yA ∈ YP (resp. yB ∈ Y) using QA (resp. QB), and sends yA
(resp. yB) to the data collector A (resp. B) to request two
different services (e.g., location check-in for A and point-of-
interest search for B). Then, the composition (QA,QB) in
parallel has the following property:
Proposition 12 (Compatibility with LDP). If QA and QB
respectively provide (XS,YP , ǫA)-ULDP and ǫB-LDP, then
for any x, x′ ∈ X , yA ∈ YP , and yB ∈ Y, we have:
(QA,QB)(yA, yB|x) ≤ eǫA+ǫB (QA,QB)(yA, yB|x′).
Proof. By (1) and (5), we have:
(QA,QB)(yA, yB|x) = QA(yA|x)QB(yB|x)
≤ eǫAQA(yA|x′)eǫBQB(yB|x′)
= eǫA+ǫB (QA,QB)(yA, yB|x′).
Proposition 12 implies that Alice’s sensitive personal data
in XS is protected by (ǫA + ǫB)-LDP after the data integra-
tion.
B.4 ULDP of the utility-optimized RR
Below we prove that the utility-optimized RR provides
ULDP.
Proposition 2. The (XS, ǫ)-uRR provides (XS,XS, ǫ)-ULDP.
Proof. It follows from (6) that (4) holds. Since c1/c2 =
eǫ, the inequality (5) also holds (note that c3 is uniquely
determined from c2 so that the sum of probabilities from
x ∈ XN is 1; i.e., c3 = 1− |XS|c2).
B.5 ULDP of the utility-optimized RAPPOR
Below we prove that the utility-optimized RAPPOR pro-
vides ULDP.
Proposition 3. The (XS, θ, ǫ)-uRAP provides (XS,YP , ǫ)-
ULDP, where YP is given by (7).
Proof. Let i, i′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |X |}.
By (7), if y ∈ YI , then only one of y|XS|+1, · · · , y|X| is 1.
In addition, it follows from (10) that for any j ∈ {|XS | +
1, · · · , |X |}, y with yj = 1 always comes from xj . Therefore,
the (XS, θ, ǫ)-utility-optimized RAPPOR satisfies (4).
To show that the (XS, θ, ǫ)-utility-optimized RAPPOR
satisfies (5), we first prove a few claims as follows.
Let y ∈ YP . If i = i′ then QuRAP (y|xi) = QuRAP (y|xi′)
obviously. Thus, we assume i 6= i′ hereafter.
Then we obtain the following claim: for any j 6= i, i′,
Pr(yj |xi)
Pr(yj |xi′) = 1. (23)
This claim is proven as follows: If 1 ≤ j ≤ |XS | and yj = 1,
then
Pr(yj |xi)
Pr(yj |xi′ )
= d1
d1
= 1. If 1 ≤ j ≤ |XS | and yj = 0, then
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Pr(yj |xi)
Pr(yj |xi′ )
= 1−d1
1−d1 = 1. Otherwise, since |XS| + 1 ≤ j ≤ |X |
and y ∈ YP , we have yj = 0, hence Pr(yj|xi)Pr(yj|xi′ ) =
1
1
= 1.
Now we show that the (XS, θ, ǫ)-utility-optimized RAP-
POR satisfies (5) as follows.
If xi, xi′ ∈ XS, then it follows from (9) that the (XS, θ, ǫ)-
utility-optimized RAPPOR is equivalent to the (θ, ǫ)-RAPPOR
in XS and YP , and thus satisfies (5).
Next we consider the case in which xi ∈ XS and xi′ ∈ XN
(i.e., 1 ≤ i ≤ |XS | and |XS | + 1 ≤ i′ ≤ |X |). By xi′ ∈ XN
and y ∈ YP , we have yi′ = 0. If yi = 1 then we have:
QuRAP (y|xi)
QuRAP (y|xi′)
=
Pr(yi|xi)
Pr(yi|xi′) ·
Pr(yi′ |xi)
Pr(yi′ |xi′) ·
∏
j 6=i
1≤j≤|XS |
Pr(yj |xi)
Pr(yj |xi′) ·
∏
j 6=i′
|XS|+1≤j≤|X|
Pr(yj |xi)
Pr(yj |xi′)
=
θ
d1
· 1
d2
· 1 · 1 (by (9), (10), and (23))
= θ · (1− θ)e
ǫ + θ
θ
· e
ǫ
(1− θ)eǫ + θ
= eǫ,
hence (5) is satisfied. If yi = 0 then we obtain:
QuRAP (y|xi)
QuRAP (y|xi′)
=
Pr(yi|xi)
Pr(yi|xi′) ·
Pr(yi′ |xi)
Pr(yi′ |xi′) ·
∏
j 6=i
1≤j≤|XS |
Pr(yj |xi)
Pr(yj |xi′) ·
∏
j 6=i′
|XS|+1≤j≤|X|
Pr(yj |xi)
Pr(yj |xi′)
=
1− θ
1− d1 ·
1
d2
· 1 · 1 (by (9), (10), and (23))
= (1− θ) · (1− θ)e
ǫ + θ
(1− θ)eǫ ·
eǫ
(1− θ)eǫ + θ
= 1,
which also imply (5).
Finally we consider the case where xi, xi′ ∈ XN (i.e.,
|XS | + 1 ≤ i, i′ ≤ |X |). By xi, xi′ ∈ XN and y ∈ YP , we
have yi = yi′ = 0. Then:
QuRAP (y|xi)
QuRAP (y|xi′)
=
Pr(yi|xi)
Pr(yi|xi′) ·
Pr(yi′ |xi)
Pr(yi′ |xi′) ·
∏
1≤j≤|XS |
Pr(yj |xi)
Pr(yj |xi′) ·
∏
j 6=i,i′
|XS |+1≤j≤|X|
Pr(yj |xi)
Pr(yj |xi′)
=
d2
1
· 1
d2
· 1 · 1 (by (9), (10), and (23))
= 1.
Therefore, the (XS, θ, ǫ)-utility-optimized RAPPOR pro-
vides (XS,YP , ǫ)-ULDP.
C. RELATIONSHIPBETWEENLDP, ULDP
AND OSLDP
Our main contributions lie in the proposal of local obfus-
cation mechanisms (i.e., uRR, uRAP, PUM) and ULDP is
introduced to characterize the main features of these mech-
anisms, i.e., LDP for sensitive data and high utility in distri-
bution estimation. Nonetheless, it is worth making clearer
the reasons for using ULDP as a privacy measure. To this
end, we also introduce the notion of OSLDP (One-sided
LDP), a local model version of OSDP (One-sided DP) pro-
posed in a preprint [17]:
Definition 6 ((XS, ǫ)-OSLDP). Given XS ⊆ X and ǫ ∈
R≥0, an obfuscation mechanism Q from X to Y provides
(XS, ǫ)-OSLDP if for any x ∈ XS, any x′ ∈ X and any
y ∈ Y, we have
Q(y|x) ≤ eǫQ(y|x′). (24)
OSLDP is a special case of OSDP [17] that takes as input
personal data of a single user. Unlike ULDP, OSLDP allows
the transition probability Q(y|x′) from non-sensitive data
x′ ∈ XN to be very large for any y ∈ Y, and hence does
not provide ǫ-LDP for Y (whereas ULDP provides ǫ-LDP
for YP ). Thus, OSLDP can be regarded as a “relaxation”
of ULDP. In fact, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 13. If an obfuscation mechanism Q provides
(XS,YP , ǫ)-ULDP, then it also provides (XS, ǫ)-OSLDP.
Proof. It is easy to check by (4) and (5) that Q provides
(24) for any x ∈ XS, any x′ ∈ X , and any y ∈ Y.
It should be noted that if an obfuscation mechanism pro-
vides ǫ-LDP, then it obviously provides (XS,YP , ǫ)-ULDP,
where YP = Y. Therefore, (XS ,YP , ǫ)-ULDP is a privacy
measure that lies between ǫ-LDP and (XS, ǫ)-OSLDP.
The advantage of ULDP over LDP is that it provides much
higher utility than LDP when |XS | ≪ |X |. As described in
Section 3.2, for ǫ ∈ [0, 1], the lower bound on the l1 and l2
losses of any ǫ-LDP mechanism can be expressed as Θ( |X|√
nǫ2
)
and Θ( |X|
nǫ2
), respectively. On the other hand, the lower
bound on the l1 and l2 losses of any (XS,YP , ǫ)-ULDP mech-
anism can be expressed as Θ( |XS |√
nǫ2
) and Θ( |XS|
nǫ2
), respec-
tively, both of which are achieved by the utility-optimized
RAPPOR. In addition, the utility-optimized RR and the
utility-optimized RAPPOR can even achieve almost the same
utility as non-private mechanisms when ǫ = ln |X |, as de-
scribed in Section 4.3.
We use ULDP instead of OSLDP for the following two
reasons. The first reason is that ULDP is compatible with
LDP, and makes it possible to perform data integration and
data analysis under LDP (Proposition 12). OSLDP does not
have this property in general, since it allows the transition
probability Q(y|x′) from non-sensitive data x′ ∈ XN to be
very large for any y ∈ Y, as explained above.
The second reason, which is more important, is that the
utility of OSLDP is not better than that of ULDP. Intu-
itively, it can be explained as follows. First, although YP
is not explicitly defined in OSLDP, we can define YP in
OSLDP as the image of XS, and YI as YI = Y \ YP , anal-
ogously to ULDP. Then, OSLDP differs from ULDP in the
following two points: (i) it allows the transition probability
Q(y|x′) from x′ ∈ XN to y ∈ YP to be very large (i.e., (5)
may not satisfied); (ii) it allows y ∈ YI to be non-invertible.
(i.e., (4) may not satisfied). Regarding (i), it is important
to note that the transition probability from x′ ∈ XN to YI
decreases with increase in the transition probability from x′
to YP . Thus, (i) and (ii) only allow us to mix non-sensitive
data with sensitive data or other non-sensitive data, and re-
duce the amount of output data y ∈ YI that can be inverted
to x ∈ XN .
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Then, each OSLDP mechanism can be decomposed into
a ULDP mechanism and a randomized post-processing that
mixes non-sensitive data with sensitive data or other non-
sensitive data. Note that this post-processing does not pre-
serve data types (in Definition 5), and hence OSLDP does
not have a compatibility with LDP as explained above. In
addition, although the post-processing might improve pri-
vacy for non-sensitive data, we would like to protect sensitive
data in this paper and ULDP is sufficient for this purpose;
i.e., it guarantees ǫ-LDP for sensitive data.
Since the information is generally lost (never gained) by
mixing data via the randomized post-processing, the util-
ity of OSLDP is not better than that of ULDP (this holds
for the information-theoretic utility such as mutual informa-
tion and f -divergences [30] because of the data processing
inequality [13, 9]; we also show this for the expected l1 and
l2 losses at the end of Appendix C). Thus, it suffices to
consider ULDP for our goal of designing obfuscation mech-
anisms that achieve high utility while providing LDP for
sensitive data (as tdescribed in Section 1).
We now formalize our claim as follows:
Proposition 14. Let MO be the class of all mechanisms
from X to Y providing (XS, ǫ)-OSLDP. For any QO ∈MO,
there exist two sets Z and ZP , a (XS,ZP , ǫ)-ULDP mech-
anism QU from X to Z, and a randomized algorithm QR
from Z to Y such that:
QO = QR ◦QU . (25)
Proof. Let QO ∈ MO and YP be the image of XS in QO .
If QO provides (XS,YP , ǫ)-ULDP, then (25) holds, where
QO = QU and QR is the identity transform. In addition,
if XS = X (i.e., XN = ∅), then all of (XS , ǫ)-OSLDP,
(XS,YP , ǫ)-ULDP, and ǫ-LDP are equivalent, and hence
(25) holds.
Assume that QO does not provide (XS,YP , ǫ)-ULDP, and
that XN 6= ∅. Below we construct a ULDP mechanism QU
by modifying QO so that the conditions (4) and (5) are
satisfied. Let W = YP ∪ XN . First, from QO , we construct
a mechanism Q†O from X to W such that:
Q†O(w|x) =


QO(w|x) (if w ∈ YP )∑
y′∈YI QO(y
′|x) (if w ∈ XN and w = x)
0 (if w ∈ XN and w 6= x).
(26)
For any w ∈ YP , we define Q†max(w) by:
Q†max(w) = max
x0∈XS
Q†O(w|x0).
For any x ∈ XN , we define α(x) by:
α(x) = 1−
∑
w∈YP
min{Q†O(w|x),Q†max(w)}.
Note that α(x) ≥ 0. Let X ′N = {x ∈ XN | α(x) > 0},
Z = YP ∪X ′N , and ZP = YP . Then, from Q†O , we construct
a mechanism QU from X to Z (= YP ∪ X ′N) such that:
QU (z|x)
=


min{Q†O(z|x),Q†max(z)} (if z ∈ YP )
α(x) (if z ∈ X ′N and z = x)
0 (if z ∈ X ′N and z 6= x).
(27)
Below we show thatQU provides (XS,ZP , ǫ)-ULDP, where
Z = YP ∪X ′N and ZP = YP . By (27), QU satisfies the first
condition (4) in Definition 2. By (24), it satisfies the second
condition (5) for any x, x′ ∈ XS and any z ∈ ZP . In addi-
tion, by (24) and (27), for any x ∈ XN , any x′ ∈ XS, and
any z ∈ ZP , we obtain:
QU (z|x) ≤ Q†max(z) (by (27))
≤ eǫQ†O(z|x′) (by (24))
= eǫQU (z|x′). (by (27)) (28)
By (24) and (28), QU satisfies the second condition (5) for
any x ∈ XN , any x′ ∈ XS, and any z ∈ YP . Furthermore, by
(24) and (27), for any x ∈ XN and any z ∈ YP , we obtain:
e−ǫQ†max(z) ≤ QU (z|x) ≤ Q†max(z). (29)
Thus, QU satisfies the second condition (5) for any x, x
′ ∈
XN and any z ∈ YP . Therefore, QU provides (XS,ZP , ǫ)-
ULDP.
Finally, we show that there exists a randomized algorithm
QR from Z to Y such thatQO = QR◦QU . Let YI = Y\YP .
First, we define a randomized algorithm QR1 from W (=
YP ∪ XN) to Y by:
QR1(y|w) =


1 (if w ∈ YP and y = w)
0 (if w ∈ YP and y 6= w)
0 (if w ∈ XN and y ∈ YP ).
QO(y|w)∑
y′∈YI
QO(y
′|w) (if w ∈ XN and y ∈ YI).
(30)
Note that
∑
y∈Y QR1(y|w) = 1 for any w ∈ W. QR1 mixes
non-sensitive data with other non-sensitive data. By (26)
and (30), we obtain:
QO = QR1 ◦Q†O (31)
(note that in (26), if w = x, then QO(y
′|x) = QO(y′|w)).
Next, for any z ∈ X ′N and any w ∈ YP , we define β(z, w)
by:
β(z, w) =
Q†O(w|z)−min{Q†O(w|z),Q†max(w)}
α(z)
,
where α(z) > 0 since z ∈ X ′N . We also define a randomized
algorithm QR2 from Z (= YP ∪X ′N ) toW (= YP ∪XN ) by:
QR2(w|z)
=


1 (if z ∈ YP and w = z)
0 (if z ∈ YP and w 6= z)
β(z, w) (if z ∈ X ′N and w ∈ YP )
1−∑w′∈YP β(z, w′) (if z ∈ X ′N , w ∈ XN , and w = z)
0 (if z ∈ X ′N , w ∈ XN , and w 6= z).
(32)
Note that β(z, w) ≥ 0, since Q†O(w|z) ≥ min{Q†O(w|z),
Q†max(w)}.
∑
w′∈YP β(z, w
′) ≤ 1, since∑w′∈YP Q†O(w′|z)−∑
w′∈YP min{Q
†
O(w
′|z),Q†max(w′)} ≤ α(z). Furthermore,
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∑
w∈W QR2(w|z) = 1 for any z ∈ Z. QR2 mixes non-
sensitive data with sensitive data. By (27) and (32), we
obtain:
Q†O = QR2 ◦QU (33)
(note that in (27), if z = x, then α(x) = α(z)). Let QR =
QR1 ◦QR2 . Then by (31) and (33), we obtain QO = QR ◦
QU .
From Proposition 14, we show that the expected l1 and
l2 losses of OSLDP are not better than those of ULDP as
follows. For any OSLDP mechanism QO ∈ MO and any
estimation method λO from data in Y, we can construct a
ULDP mechanism QO by (27) and an estimation method
λU that perturbs data in Z via QR and then estimates a
distribution from data in Y via λO. QU and λU provide
the same expected l1 and l2 losses as QO and λO, and there
might also exist ULDP mechanisms and estimation methods
from data in Z that provide smaller expected l1 and l2 losses.
Thus, the expected l1 and l2 losses of OSLDP are not better
than those of ULDP.
D. L1LOSSOFTHEUTILITY-OPTIMIZED
MECHANISMS
In this section we show the detailed analyses on the l1 loss
of the utility-optimized RR and the utility-optimized RAP-
POR. Table 3 summarizes the l1 loss of each obfuscation
mechanism.
D.1 l1 loss of the utility-optimized RR
We first present the l1 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-utility-optimized
RR. In the theoretical analysis of utility, we use the empirical
estimation method described in Section 2.5. Then it follows
from (6) that the distribution m of the obfuscated data can
be written as follows:
m(x) =
{
eǫ−1
|XS |+eǫ−1p(x) +
1
|XS |+eǫ−1 (if x ∈ XS)
eǫ−1
|XS |+eǫ−1p(x) (if x ∈ XN).
(34)
The empirical estimate of p is given by:
pˆ(x) =
{ |XS |+eǫ−1
eǫ−1 mˆ(x)− 1eǫ−1 (if x ∈ XS)
|XS |+eǫ−1
eǫ−1 mˆ(x) (if x ∈ XN).
(35)
The following proposition is derived from (34) and (35):
Proposition 4 (l1 loss of the uRR). Let ǫ ∈ R≥0, u =
|XS |+ eǫ − 1, u′ = eǫ − 1, and v = uu′ . Then the expected l1
loss of the (XS, ǫ)-uRR mechanism is given by:
E [l1(pˆ,p)] ≈
√
2
nπ
( ∑
x∈XS
√(
p(x) + 1/u′
)(
v − p(x)− 1/u′)
+
∑
x∈XN
√
p(x)
(
v − p(x))), (11)
where f(n) ≈ g(n) represents limn→∞ f(n)/g(n) = 1.
Proof. Let t be a frequency distribution of the obfuscated
data with sample size n; i.e., t(x) = mˆ(x)n. By ǫ > 0, we
have u > 0 and v > 0. By (34) and (35), the l1 loss of pˆ can
be written as follows:
E
Y n∼mn
[l1(pˆ,p)] = E
[∑
x∈X
|pˆ(x)− p(x)|
]
= E
[∑
x∈X
v · |mˆ(x)−m(x)|
]
=
∑
x∈X
v · E [ |mˆ(x)−m(x)| ]
=
∑
x∈X
v · E
[ ∣∣∣∣t(x)n − E
[
t(x)
n
]∣∣∣∣
]
=
∑
x∈X
v√
n
· E
[ ∣∣∣∣ t(x)− Et(x)√n
∣∣∣∣
]
.
It follows from the central limit theorem that t(x)−Et(x)√
n
con-
verges to the normal distribution N (0,m(x)(1−m(x))) as
n → ∞. Here we use the fact that the absolute moment of
a random variable G ∼ N (µ, σ) is given by:
E[ |G| ] =
√
2
π
· σ · Φ(− 1
2
, 1
2
;− µ2
2σ2
)
where Φ is Kummer’s confluent hypergeometric function.
(See [52] for details.) Hence we obtain:
lim
n→∞
E
Y n∼mn
[ ∣∣∣∣ t(x)− Et(x)√n
∣∣∣∣
]
=
√
2
π
m(x)(1−m(x)).
(36)
Then we have:
E [l1(pˆ,p)] ≈
√
2
nπ
·
∑
x∈X
v
√
m(x)(1−m(x)). (37)
Recall that u = |XS | + eǫ − 1, u′ = eǫ − 1, and v = uu′ . It
follows from (34) that for x ∈ XS, m(x) = p(x)/v + 1/u,
and for x ∈ XN , m(x) = p(x)/v. Therefore, we obtain:
E [l1(pˆ,p)]
≈
√
2
nπ
( ∑
x∈XS
v
√(
p(x)/v + 1/u
)(
1− p(x)/v − 1/u)
+
∑
x∈XN
v
√
p(x)/v
(
1− p(x)/v))
=
√
2
nπ
( ∑
x∈XS
√(
p(x) + 1/u′
)(
v − p(x)− 1/u′)
+
∑
x∈XN
√
p(x)
(
v − p(x))).
D.1.1 Maximum of the l1 loss
Next we show that when 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN |+ 1), the l1 loss
is maximized by the uniform distribution pUN over XN .
Proposition 5. For any 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN | + 1) and |XS | ≤
|XN |, (11) is maximized by pUN :
E [l1(pˆ,p)] . E [l1(pˆ,pUN )]
=
√
2
nπ
(
|XS |
√
|XS|+eǫ−2
eǫ−1 +
√
|XS ||XN |
eǫ−1 + |XN | − 1
)
, (12)
where f(n) . g(n) represents limn→∞ f(n)/g(n) ≤ 1.
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Table 3: l1 loss of each obfuscation mechanism in the worst case (RR: randomized response, RAP: RAPPOR,
uRR: utility-optimized RR, uRAP: utility-optimized RAPPOR, no privacy: non-private mechanism, *1:
approximation in the case where |XS | ≪ |X |).
Mechanism ǫ ≈ 0 ǫ = ln |X |
RR
√
2
nπ
|X|
√
|X|−1
ǫ
√
8(|X|−1)
nπ
RAP
√
2
nπ
· 2|X|
ǫ
√
2
√
X (|X|−1)
nπ
uRR
√
2
nπ
· |XS|
√
|XS |−1
ǫ
(see Appendix D.1.2)
√
2(|X|−1)
nπ
(∗1) (see Appendix D.1.3)
uRAP
√
2
nπ
· 2|XS |
ǫ
(see Appendix D.2.2)
√
2(|X|−1)
nπ
(
1 + |XS |
|X|
3
4
)
(∗1) (see Appendix D.2.3)
no privacy
√
2(|X|−1)
nπ
Here we do not present the general result for |XS | > |XN |,
because in this section later, we are interested in using this
proposition to analyze the utility for |X | ≫ |XS|, where the
utility-optimized mechanism is useful.
To prove these propositions, we first show the lemma be-
low.
Lemma 1. Assume 1 ≤ |XS| ≤ |XN |. Let u′ = eǫ − 1 and
v = |XS|+e
ǫ−1
eǫ−1 . For w ∈ [0, 1], we define A(w), B(w), and
F (w) by:
A(w) =
(
w + |XS |
u′
)(
v|XS | − w − |XS |u′
)
B(w) =
(
1− w)(v|XN | − 1 +w)
F (w) =
√
A(w) +
√
B(w).
Then for any 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN |+1), F (w) is decreasing in w.
Proof. Let 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN | + 1) and w ∈ [0, 1). By ǫ > 0,
|XS | ≥ 1, 0 ≤ w ≤ 1, v = |XS |+e
ǫ−1
eǫ−1 ≥ 1, and v − 1u′ =
|XS |−1
eǫ−1 + 1 ≥ 1, we have A(w) > 0 and B(w) > 0. Then:
d
√
A(w)
dw
=
1
2
√
A(w)
dA(w)
dw
=
1
2
√
A(w)
(
−2w + |XS |
(
v − 2
u′
))
d
√
B(w)
dw
=
1
2
√
B(w)
dB(w)
dw
=
1
2
√
B(w)
(
−2w + (−v|XN |+ 2)).
Let Cw = min
(
2
√
A(w), 2
√
B(w)
)
. By Cw > 0, we obtain:
dF (w)
dw
=
d
√
A(w)
dw
+
d
√
B(w)
dw
≤ 1
Cw
(
−2w + |XS|
(
v − 2
u′
)− 2w + (−v|XN |+ 2))
=
1
Cw
(
−4w + |XS|
(
v − 2
u′
)− |XN |(v − 2|XN |)
)
≤ 1
Cw
(
−4w + |XN |
(
v − 2
u′
)− |XN |(v − 2|XN |)
)
(by |XS | ≤ |XN |)
=
1
Cw
(
−4w + 2|XN |
(
1
|XN | −
1
u′
))
.
Recall that u′ = eǫ − 1. By eǫ < |XN |+ 1, we have:
1
|XN | −
1
u′
=
1
|XN | −
1
eǫ − 1 <
1
|XN | −
1
|XN | = 0.
Hence dF (w)
dw
< 0. Therefore for w ∈ [0, 1), F (w) is decreas-
ing in w.
Now we prove Proposition 5 as follows.
Proof. Let 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN | + 1). Let CSN be the set of all
distributions p∗ over X that satisfy:
• for any x ∈ XS , p∗(x) = p
∗(XS)
|XS| , and
• for any x ∈ XN , p∗(x) = p
∗(XN )
|XN | =
1−p∗(XS)
|XN | .
Note that CSN is the set of mixture distributions of the uni-
form distribution pUS over XS and the uniform distribution
pUN over XN .
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, for any a1, a2, . . . , aL
≥ 0, ∑Li=1√ai ≤
√
L
∑L
i=1 ai, where the equality holds iff
a1 = a2 = . . . = aL. Hence by (11) we obtain:
E [l1(pˆ,p)]
.
√
2
nπ
(√
|XS |
∑
x∈XS
(
p(x) + 1/u′
)(
v − p(x)− 1/u′)
+
√
|XN |
∑
x∈XN
p(x)
(
v − p(x))),
where ≈ holds iff p ∈ CSN .
Therefore we obtain:
E [l1(pˆ,p)]
.
√
2
nπ
(√
|XS |2
(
p(XS)
|XS| + 1/u
′
)(
v − p(XS)|XS | − 1/u′
)
(38)
+
√
|XN |2 1−p(XS)|XN |
(
v − 1−p(XS)|XN |
))
=
√
2
nπ
(√(
p(XS) + |XS|/u′
)(
v|XS | − p(XS)− |XS|/u′
)
+
√(
1− p(XS)
)(
v|XN | − 1 + p(XS)
)
=
√
2
nπ
F (p(XS)), (39)
where F is defined in Lemma 1. Note that in (38), ≈ holds
iff p ∈ CSN .
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By Lemma 1 and 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN | + 1), F (p(XS)) is
maximized when p(XS) = 0. Hence the right-hand side of
(11) is maximized when p(XS) = 0 and p ∈ CSN , i.e., when
p is the uniform distribution pUN over XN .
Therefore we obtain:
E [l1(pˆ,p)]
.E [l1(pˆ,pUN )]
=
√
2
nπ
F (0)
=
√
2
nπ
(√
|XS |2
u′
(
v − 1
u′
)
+
√
v|XN | − 1
)
=
√
2
nπ
(|XS |√|XS |+eǫ−2
eǫ−1 +
√
|XS ||XN |
eǫ−1 + |XN | − 1
)
.
Finally, we show that when ǫ ≥ ln(|XN | + 1), the l1 loss
is maximized by a mixture of the uniform distribution pUS
over XS and the uniform distribution pUN over XN .
Proposition 6. Let p∗ be a distribution over X defined by:
p∗(x) =


1−|XN |/(eǫ−1)
|XS |+|XN | (if x ∈ XS)
1+|XS |/(eǫ−1)
|XS |+|XN | (otherwise)
(13)
Then for any ǫ ≥ ln(|XN |+ 1), (11) is maximized by p∗:
E [l1(pˆ,p)] . E [l1(pˆ,p
∗)] =
√
2(|X|−1)
nπ
· |XS |+eǫ−1
eǫ−1 , (14)
where f(n) . g(n) represents limn→∞ f(n)/g(n) ≤ 1.
Proof. We show that for any ǫ ≥ ln(|XN | + 1), the right-
hand side of (11) is maximized when p = p∗. (Note that by
ǫ ≥ ln(|XN |+ 1), p∗(x) ≥ 0 holds for all x ∈ X .)
To show this, we prove that if p = p∗ then m is the
uniform distribution over Y as follows. If x ∈ XS then we
have:
m(x) =
eǫ − 1
|XS |+ eǫ − 1p
∗(x) +
1
|XS |+ eǫ − 1
=
eǫ − 1
|XS |+ eǫ − 1
1− |XN |
eǫ−1
|XS|+ |XN | +
1
|XS|+ eǫ − 1
=
eǫ − 1− |XN |+ (|XS|+ |XN |)
(|XS|+ eǫ − 1)(|XS |+ |XN |)
=
1
|X | .
On the other hand, if x ∈ XN then we obtain:
m(x) =
eǫ − 1
|XS|+ eǫ − 1p
∗(x)
=
eǫ − 1
|XS|+ eǫ − 1
1 + |XS |
eǫ−1
|XS|+ |XN |
=
1
|X | .
Hence m is the uniform distribution over Y.
By (37) and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we obtain:
E [l1(pˆ,p)] .
√
2
nπ
· v
√
|X |
∑
x∈X
m(x)(1−m(x)),
where ≈ holds iff m is the uniform distribution over Y, or
equivalently p = p∗. Hence:
E [l1(pˆ,p)] . E [l1(pˆ,p
∗)]
=
√
2
nπ
· v
√
|X |
∑
x∈X
1
|X |
(
1− 1|X |
)
=
√
2(|X | − 1)
nπ
· |XS|+ e
ǫ − 1
eǫ − 1 .
D.1.2 l1 loss in the high privacy regime
Consider the high privacy regime where ǫ ≈ 0. In this
case, eǫ − 1 ≈ ǫ. By using this approximation, we simplify
the l1 loss of the utility-optimized RR for both the cases
where |XS | ≤ |XN | and where |XS| > |XN |.
Case 1: |XS| ≤ |XN |. By Proposition 5, the expected l1 loss
of the (XS, ǫ)-utility-optimized RR mechanism is maximized
by pUN and given by:
E [l1(pˆ,p)]
. E [l1(pˆ,pUN )]
≈
√
2
nπ
(
|XS |
√
|XS |+ǫ−1
ǫ
+
√
|XS|·|XN |
ǫ
+ |XN | − 1
)
(by eǫ − 1 ≈ ǫ)
≈
√
2
nπ
· |XS|
√|XS | − 1
ǫ
(by ǫ ≈ 0).
Case 2: |XS | > |XN |. Let F be the function defined in
Lemma 1, w∗ = argmaxw∈[0,1] F (w), and p
∗ be the prior
distribution over X defined by:
p∗(x) =
{
w∗
|XS | (if x ∈ XS)
1−w∗
|XN | (otherwise).
Then, by (39), E [l1(pˆ,p)] is maximized by p
∗. Thus, for
ǫ ≈ 0, the expected l1 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-utility-optimized
RR mechanism is given by:
E [l1(pˆ,p)] . [l1(pˆ,p
∗)]
=
√
2
nπ
F (w∗)
≈
√
2
nπ
(√(
w∗ + |XS |
ǫ
)( |XS |2
ǫ
− w∗ − |XS|
ǫ
)
+
√(
1−w∗)( |XS ||XN |
ǫ
− 1 + w∗))
(by u′ = eǫ − 1 ≈ ǫ and v ≈ |XS |
ǫ
)
=
√
2
nπ
(√
|XS |2(|XS |−1)
ǫ2
+O(ǫ−1) +
√
O(ǫ−1)
)
(by 0 ≤ w∗ ≤ 1)
≈
√
2
nπ
· |XS|
√|XS | − 1
ǫ
. (by ǫ ≈ 0)
In summary, the expected l1 loss of the utility-optimized
RR is at most
√
2
nπ
· |XS |
√
|XS|−1
ǫ
in the high privacy regime,
20
irrespective of whether |XS | ≤ |XN | or not. It is shown
in [29] that the expected l1 loss of the ǫ-RR is at most√
2
nπ
|X|
√
|X|−1
ǫ
when ǫ ≈ 0. Thus, the expected l1 loss of
the (XS , ǫ)-utility-optimized RR is much smaller than that
of the ǫ-RR when |XS | ≪ |X |.
D.1.3 l1 loss in the low privacy regime
Consider the low privacy regime where ǫ = ln |X | and
|XS | ≪ |X |. By Proposition 6, the expected l1 loss of the
(XS, ǫ)-utility-optimized RR is given by:
E [l1(pˆ,p)] . E [l1(pˆ,p
∗)]
=
√
2(|X | − 1)
nπ
· |XS |+ |X | − 1|X | − 1
=
√
2(|X | − 1)
nπ
(
1 +
|XS |
|X | − 1
)
≈
√
2(|X | − 1)
nπ
. (by |XS|/|X | ≈ 0)
It should be noted that the expected l1 loss of the non-
private mechanism, which does not obfuscate the personal
data, is at most
√
2(|X|−1)
nπ
[29]. Thus, when ǫ = ln |X |
and |XS | ≪ |X |, the (XS, ǫ)-utility-optimized RR achieves
almost the same data utility as the non-private mechanism,
whereas the expected l1 loss of the ǫ-RR is twice larger than
that of the non-private mechanism [29].
D.2 l1 loss of the utility-optimized RAPPOR
We first present the l1 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-utility-optimized
RAPPOR. Recall that mj (resp. mˆj) is the true probabil-
ity (resp. empirical probability) that the j-th coordinate in
obfuscated data is 1. It follows from (8), (9) and (10) that
mj can be written as follows:
mj =
{
eǫ/2−1
eǫ/2+1
p(xj) +
1
eǫ/2+1
(if 1 ≤ j ≤ |XS |)
eǫ/2−1
eǫ/2
p(xj) (otherwise).
(40)
Then, the empirical estimate pˆ is given by:
pˆ(xj) =
{
eǫ/2+1
eǫ/2−1mˆj − 1eǫ/2−1 (if 1 ≤ j ≤ |XS |)
eǫ/2
eǫ/2−1mˆj (otherwise).
(41)
The following proposition is derived from (40) and (41):
Proposition 7 (l1 loss of the uRAP). Let ǫ ∈ R≥0, u′ =
eǫ/2 − 1, and vN = eǫ/2
eǫ/2−1 . The expected l1-loss of the
(XS, ǫ)-uRAP mechanism is:
E [l1(pˆ,p)] ≈
√
2
nπ
(|XS|∑
j=1
√(
p(xj) + 1/u′
)(
vN − p(xj)
)
+
|X|∑
j=|XS|+1
√
p(xj)
(
vN − p(xj)
))
, (16)
where f(n) ≈ g(n) represents limn→∞ f(n)/g(n) = 1.
Proof. Let vS =
eǫ/2+1
eǫ/2−1 . By ǫ > 0, we have vS > 0 and
vN > 0.
Analogously to the derivation of (37) in Appendix D.1, it
follows from (40) and (41) that:
E [l1(pˆ,p)] ≈
√
2
nπ
|XS |∑
j=1
vS ·
√
mj(1−mj)
+
√
2
nπ
|X|∑
j=|XS|+1
vN ·
√
mj(1−mj).
Let u = eǫ/2 + 1. Then vS =
u
u′
and vN =
u−1
u′
. It follows
from (40) that for 1 ≤ j ≤ |XS |, mj = p(xj)/vS + 1/u,
and for |XS|+ 1 ≤ j ≤ |X |, mj = p(xj)/vN . Therefore, we
obtain:
E [l1(pˆ,p)]
≈
√
2
nπ
(|XS|∑
j=1
vS
√(
p(xj)/vS + 1/u
)(
1− p(xj)/vS − 1/u
)
+
|X|∑
j=|XS|+1
vN
√
p(xj)/vN
(
1− p(xj)/vN
))
=
√
2
nπ
(|XS|∑
j=1
√(
p(xj) + 1/u′
)(
vS − p(xj)− 1/u′
)
+
|X|∑
j=|XS|+1
√
p(xj)
(
vN − p(xj)
))
=
√
2
nπ
(|XS|∑
j=1
√(
p(xj) + 1/u′
)(
vN − p(xj)
)
+
|X|∑
j=|XS|+1
√
p(xj)
(
vN − p(xj)
))
.
D.2.1 Maximum of the l1 loss
Next we show that when 0 < ǫ < 2 ln( |XN |
2
+ 1), the l1
loss is maximized by the uniform distribution pUN over XN .
Proposition 8. For any 0 < ǫ < 2 ln( |XN |
2
+1) and |XS| ≤
|XN |, (16) is maximized when p = pUN :
E [l1(pˆ,p)] . E [l1(pˆ,pUN )]
=
√
2
nπ
(
eǫ/4|XS |
eǫ/2−1 +
√
eǫ/2|XN |
eǫ/2−1 − 1
)
, (17)
where f(n) . g(n) represents limn→∞ f(n)/g(n) ≤ 1.
To prove this proposition, we first show the lemma below.
Lemma 2. Assume 1 ≤ |XS| ≤ |XN |. Let u′ = eǫ/2 − 1
and vn =
eǫ/2
eǫ/2−1 . For w ∈ [0, 1], we define A(w), B(w), and
F (w) by:
A(w) =
(
w + |XS |
u′
)(
vN |XS | − w
)
B(w) =
(
1− w)(vN |XN | − 1 +w)
F (w) =
√
A(w) +
√
B(w).
Then for any 0 < ǫ < 2 ln( |XN |
2
+ 1), F (w) is decreasing
in w.
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Proof. Let 0 < ǫ < 2 ln( |XN |
2
+ 1) and w ∈ [0, 1). By ǫ > 0,
|XS | ≥ 1, and vn = eǫ/2
eǫ/2−1 > 1, we have A(w) > 0 and
B(w) > 0. Then:
d
√
A(w)
dw
=
1
2
√
A(w)
dA(w)
dw
=
1
2
√
A(w)
(
−2w + |XS|
(
vN − 1u′
))
d
√
B(w)
dw
=
1
2
√
B(w)
dB(w)
dw
=
1
2
√
B(w)
(
−2w + (−vN |XN |+ 2)).
Let Cw = min
(
2
√
A(w), 2
√
B(w)
)
. By Cw > 0, we obtain:
dF (w)
dw
=
d
√
A(w)
dw
+
d
√
B(w)
dw
≤ 1
Cw
(
−2w + |XS |
(
vN − 1u′
)− 2w − |XN |(vN − 2|XN |)
)
≤ 1
Cw
(
−4w + |XN |
(
vN − 1u′
)− |XN |(vN − 2|XN |)
)
(by |XS | ≤ |XN |)
≤ 1
Cw
(
−4w + |XN |
(
2
|XN | −
1
u′
))
.
Recall that u′ = eǫ/2 − 1. By ǫ < 2 ln( |XN |
2
+ 1
)
, we have
eǫ/2 < |XN |
2
+ 1, hence:
2
|XN | −
1
u′
=
2
|XN | −
1
eǫ/2 − 1 <
2
|XN | −
2
|XN | = 0.
Hence dF (w)
dw
< 0. Therefore for w ∈ [0, 1), F (w) is decreas-
ing in w.
Now we prove Proposition 8 as follows.
Proof. Let 0 < ǫ < 2 ln
( |XN |
2
+ 1
)
. As with the proof for
Proposition 5, let CSN be the set of all distributions p∗ over
X that satisfy:
• for any 1 ≤ j ≤ |XS |, p∗(xj) = p
∗(XS)
|XS| , and
• for any |XS| + 1 ≤ j ≤ |X |, p∗(xj) = p
∗(XN )
|XN | =
1−p∗(XS)
|XN | .
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, for any a1, a2, . . . , aL ≥ 0,∑L
i=1
√
ai ≤
√
L
∑L
i=1 ai, where the equality holds iff a1 =
a2 = . . . = aL. Hence by (16) we obtain:
E [l1(pˆ,p)] .
√
2
nπ
(√√√√|XS| |XS |∑
j=1
(
p(xj) + 1/u′
)(
vN − p(xj)
)
+
√√√√√|XN | |X|∑
j=|XS |+1
p(xj)
(
vN − p(xj)
))
,
where the equality holds iff p ∈ CSN .
Therefore we obtain:
E [l1(pˆ,p)]
.
√
2
nπ
(√
|XS|2
(
p(XS)
|XS | + 1/u
′
)(
vN − p(XS)|XS |
)
(42)
+
√
|XN |2 1−p(XS )|XN |
(
vN − 1−p(XS)|XN |
))
=
√
2
nπ
(√(
p(XS) + |XS |/u′
)(
vN |XS| − p(XS)
)
+
√(
1− p(XS)
)(
vN |XN | − 1 + p(XS)
))
=
√
2
nπ
F (p(XS)) (43)
where F is defined in Lemma 2. Note that in (42), ≈ holds
iff p ∈ CSN .
By Lemma 2 and 0 < ǫ < 2 ln( |XN |
2
+ 1), F (p(XS)) is
maximized when p(XS) = 0. Hence the right-hand side of
(16) is maximized when p(XS) = 0 and p ∈ CSN , i.e., when
p is the uniform distribution pUN over XN .
Therefore we obtain:
E [l1(pˆ,p)] .E [l1(pˆ,pUN )]
=
√
2
nπ
F (0)
=
√
2
nπ
(√
|XS|2
u′
vN +
√
vN |XN | − 1
)
=
√
2
nπ
(
eǫ/4|XS |
eǫ/2 − 1 +
√
eǫ/2|XN |
eǫ/2 − 1 − 1
)
.
D.2.2 l1 loss in the high privacy regime
Consider the high privacy regime where ǫ ≈ 0. In this
case, eǫ/2 − 1 ≈ ǫ/2. By using this approximation, we sim-
plify the l1 loss of the utility-optimized RAPPOR for both
the cases where |XS | ≤ |XN | and where |XS| > |XN |.
Case 1: |XS| ≤ |XN |. By Proposition 8, the expected l1
loss of the (XS , ǫ)-utility-optimized RAPPOR mechanism is
given by:
E [l1(pˆ,p)] . E [l1(pˆ,pUN )]
=
√
2
nπ
(√
|XS|2
u′
vN +
√
vN |XN | − 1
)
≈
√
2
nπ
(√
|XS|2 2ǫ
ǫ
2
+
√
2|XN |
ǫ
− 1
)
(by eǫ/2 − 1 ≈ ǫ/2)
=
√
2
nπ
(
2|XS |
ǫ
+
√
2|XN | − ǫ
ǫ
)
≈
√
2
nπ
· 2|XS |
ǫ
(by ǫ ≈ 0).
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Case 2: |XS | > |XN |. Let F be the function defined in
Lemma 2, w∗ = argmaxw∈[0,1] F (w), and p
∗ be the prior
distribution over X defined by:
p∗(xj) =
{
w∗
|XS | (if 1 ≤ j ≤ |XS|)
1−w∗
|XN | (if |XS |+ 1 ≤ j ≤ |X |)
Then, by (43), E [l1(pˆ,p)] is maximized by p
∗. Thus, for
ǫ ≈ 0, the expected l1 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-utility-optimized
RAPPOR mechanism is given by:
E [l1(pˆ,p)] . [l1(pˆ,p
∗)]
=
√
2
nπ
F (w∗)
≈
√
2
nπ
(√(
w∗ + |XS |
ǫ/2
)( 2|XS |
ǫ
− w∗)
+
√(
1−w∗)( 2|XN |
ǫ
− 1 + w∗))
(by u′ = eǫ − 1 ≈ ǫ
2
and vN ≈ 2ǫ )
=
√
2
nπ
(√
4|XS |2
ǫ2
+O(ǫ−1) +
√
O(ǫ−1)
)
(by 0 ≤ w∗ ≤ 1)
≈
√
2
nπ
· 2|XS |
ǫ
. (by ǫ ≈ 0)
In summary, the expected l1 loss of the utility-optimized
RAPPOR is at most
√
2
nπ
· 2|XS |
ǫ
in the high privacy regime,
irrespective of whether |XS | ≤ |XN | or not. It is shown
in [29] that the expected l1 loss of the ǫ-RAPPOR is at
most
√
2
nπ
· 2|X|
ǫ
when ǫ ≈ 0. Thus, the expected l1 loss of
the (XS, ǫ)-utility-optimized RAPPOR is much smaller than
that of the ǫ-RAPPOR when |XS | ≪ |X |.
Note that the expected l1 loss of the utility-optimized
RAPPOR in the worst case can also be expressed as Θ( |XS |√
nǫ2
)
in this case. As described in Section 3.2, this is “order” op-
timal among all ULDP mechanisms.
D.2.3 l1 loss in the low privacy regime
Consider the low privacy regime where ǫ = ln |X | and
|XS | ≪ |X |. In this case, we have ǫ = ln |X | < 2 ln( |XN |2 +
1) (since |X | < ( |XN |
2
+ 1)2). Then by Proposition 8, the
expected l1 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-utility-optimized RAPPOR
mechanism is given by:
E [l1(pˆ,p)]
. E [l1(pˆ,pUN )]
=
√
2
nπ
(√
|XS |2
u′
vN +
√
vN |XN | − 1
)
≈
√
2
nπ
(
|XS |√
eǫ/2−1
+
√
|XN | − 1
)
(
by vN =
eǫ/2
eǫ/2−1 =
√
|X|√
|X|−1 ≈ 1
)
≈
√
2
nπ
(
|XS |√√
|X|−1
+
√
|X | − 1
)
(by |XN | ≈ |X |)
≈
√
2(|X | − 1)
nπ
(
1 +
|XS|
|X | 34
)
. (by |X | ≫ 1) (44)
When |XS | ≪ |X | 34 , the right-hand side of (44) can be sim-
plified as follows:√
2(|X | − 1)
nπ
(
1 +
|XS |
|X | 34
)
≈
√
2(|X | − 1)
nπ
.
Note that the expected l1 loss of the non-private mecha-
nism is at most
√
2(|X|−1)
nπ
[29]. Thus, when ǫ = ln |X |
and |XS | ≪ |X | 34 , the (XS, ǫ)-utility-optimized RAPPOR
achieves almost the same data utility as the non-private
mechanism, whereas the expected l1 loss of the ǫ-RAPPOR
is
√|X | times larger than that of the non-private mechanism
[29].
E. L2LOSSOFTHEUTILITY-OPTIMIZED
MECHANISMS
In this section we theoretically analyze the l2 loss of the
utility-optimized RR and the utility-optimized RAPPOR.
Table 4 summarizes the l2 loss of each obfuscation mecha-
nism. We also show the results of the MSE in our experi-
ments.
E.1 l2 loss of the utility-optimized RR
We first present the l2-loss of the (XS, ǫ)-utility-optimized
RR.
Proposition 15 (l2 loss of the uRR). The expected l2-loss
of the (XS, ǫ)-uRR mechanism is given by:
E[l22(pˆ,p)] =
2(eǫ − 1)(|XS| − p(XS)) + |XS |(|XS| − 1)
n(eǫ − 1)2
+
1
n
(
1−
∑
x∈X
p(x)2
)
. (45)
Proof. Let u = |XS | + eǫ − 1, u′ = eǫ − 1, and v = uu′ . By
ǫ > 0, we have u > 0 and v > 0.
Let t be a frequency distribution of the obfuscated data
Y; i.e., t(x) = mˆ(x)n. Since t(x) follows the binomial dis-
tribution with parameters n and m(x), the mean is given
by E[t(x)] = nm(x), and the variance of t(x) is given by
Var(t(x)) = nm(x)(1−m(x)).
Then, by (34) and (35), the l2-loss of pˆ can be written as
follows:
E
Y n∼mn
[
l22(pˆ,p)
]
= E
[∑
x∈X
(pˆ(x)− p(x))2
]
= E
[∑
x∈X
v2 · (mˆ(x)−m(x))2
]
=
∑
x∈X
v2 · E [ (mˆ(x)−m(x))2 ]
=
∑
x∈X
v2 · E
[(
t(x)
n
− E
[
t(x)
n
])2 ]
=
∑
x∈X
v2 · Var(t(x))
n2
= v2
∑
x∈X
m(x)(1−m(x))
n
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Table 4: l2 loss of each obfuscation mechanism in the worst case (RR: randomized response, RAP: RAPPOR,
uRR: utility-optimized RR, uRAP: utility-optimized RAPPOR, no privacy: non-private mechanism, *1:
approximation in the case where |XS | ≪ |X |).
Mechanism ǫ ≈ 0 ǫ = ln |X |
RR |X|(|X|−1)
nǫ2
4
n
(
1− 1|X|
)
RAP 4|X|
nǫ2
(
1− 1|X|
) √|X|
n
(
1− 1|X|
)
uRR |XS |(|XS|−1)
nǫ2
(see Appendix E.1.2) 1
n
(∗1) (see Appendix E.1.3)
uRAP 4|XS |
nǫ2
(see Appendix E.2.2) 1
n
(
1 + |XS |+1√|X|
)
(∗1) (see Appendix E.2.3)
no privacy 1
n
(
1− 1|X|
)
=
v2
n
(
1−
∑
x∈X
m(x)2
)
. (46)
It follows from (34) that for x ∈ XS,m(x) = p(x)/v+1/u,
and for x ∈ XN , m(x) = p(x)/v. Therefore, we obtain:
E
[
l22(pˆ,p)
]
=
v2
n
(
1−
∑
x∈XS
(
p(x)/v + 1/u
)2 − ∑
x∈XN
(
p(x)/v
)2)
=
1
n
(
v2 −
∑
x∈XS
(
p(x) + 1/u′
)2 − ∑
x∈XN
p(x)2
)
=
1
n
(
v2 −
∑
x∈X
p(x)2 −
∑
x∈XS
2p(x)/u′ −
∑
x∈XS
1
u′2
))
=
1
n
(
v2 −
∑
x∈X
p(x)2 − 2p(XS )
u′
− |XS |
u′2
))
=
u2 − 2u′p(XS)− |XS|
nu′2
− 1
n
∑
x∈X
p(x)2
= (|XS |+e
ǫ−1)2−2(eǫ−1)p(XS)−|XS |
n(eǫ−1)2 − 1n
∑
x∈X
p(x)2
= 2(e
ǫ−1)(|XS |−p(XS))+|XS|(|XS |−1)
n(eǫ−1)2 +
1
n
(
1−
∑
x∈X
p(x)2
)
E.1.1 Maximum of the l2 loss
Next we show that when 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN |+ 1), the l2 loss
is maximized by the uniform distribution pUN over XN .
Proposition 16. For any 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN | + 1), (45) is
maximized by the uniform distribution pUN over XN :
E
[
l22(pˆ,p)
] ≤ E [l22(pˆ,pUN )]
= |XS |(|XS|+2e
ǫ−3)
n(eǫ−1)2 +
1
n
(
1− 1|XN |
)
.
To show this proposition, we first show the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For w ∈ [0, 1], we define F (w) by:
F (w) = − 2
n(eǫ − 1)w +
1
n
(
1− w
2
|XS | −
(1− w)2
|XN |
)
.
Then for any 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN |+1), F (w) is decreasing in w.
Proof. Let 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN | + 1) and w ∈ [0, 1]. Then
eǫ − 1 < |XN |.
dF (w)
dw
= − 2
n(eǫ − 1) +
1
n
(
− 2w|XS | −
2w − 2
|XN |
)
< − 2
n|XN | +
1
n
(
− 2w|XS | −
2w
|XN | +
2
|XN |
)
≤ 0. (by w ≥ 0)
Therefore, F (w) is decreasing in w.
Now we prove Proposition 16 as follows.
Proof. Let M = |XS|(|XS |+2e
ǫ−3)
n(eǫ−1)2 . By (45), we have:
E
[
l22(pˆ,p)
]
=M − 2
n(eǫ−1)p(XS) + 1n
(
1−
∑
x∈X
p(x)2
)
.
Let CSN be the set of distributions p∗ over X such that:
• for any x ∈ XS , p∗(x) = p
∗(XS)
|XS| , and
• for any x ∈ XN , p∗(x) = p
∗(XN )
|XN | =
1−p∗(XS)
|XN | .
By the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means, we
obtain: ∑
x∈XS
p(x)2 ≥ |XS |
√∏
x∈XS p(x)
2 · |XS |,
where the equality holds iff for all x ∈ XS, p(x) = p(XS)|XS | .
An analogous inequality holds for XN . Therefore we obtain:∑
x∈X
p(x)2 ≥ |XS |
√ ∏
x∈XS
p(x)2 · |XS |+ |XN |
√ ∏
x∈XN
p(x)2 · |XN |
= p(XS)
2
|XS | +
p(XN ))2
|XN |
= p(XS)
2
|XS | +
(1−p(XS ))2
|XN | ,
where the equality holds iff p ∈ CSN .
Hence we obtain:
E
[
l22(pˆ,p)
]
=M − 2
n(eǫ−1)p(XS) + 1n
(
1−
∑
x∈X
p(x)2
)
≤M − 2
n(eǫ−1)p(XS) + 1n
(
1− p(XS)2|XS| −
(1−p(XS ))2
|XN |
)
=M + F (p(XS)),
where F is defined in Lemma 3, and the equality holds iff
p ∈ CSN .
By Lemma 3 and 0 < ǫ < ln(|XN |+1), F (p(XS)) is maxi-
mized when p(XS) = 0. Therefore E
[
l22(pˆ,p)
]
is maximized
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when p(XS) = 0 and p ∈ CSN , i.e., when p is the uniform
distribution pUN over XN .
Therefore we obtain:
E
[
l22(pˆ,p)
] ≤ E [l22(pˆ,pUN )]
=M + F (0)
= |XS|(|XS |+2e
ǫ−3)
n(eǫ−1)2 +
1
n
(
1− 1|XN |
)
Next, we show that when ǫ ≥ ln(|XN | + 1), the l2 loss
is maximized by a mixture of the uniform distribution pUS
over XS and the uniform distribution pUN over XN .
Proposition 17. Let p∗ be a distribution over X defined by:
p∗(x) =


1−|XN |/(eǫ−1)
|XS |+|XN | (if x ∈ XS)
1+|XS |/(eǫ−1)
|XS |+|XN | (otherwise)
Then for any ǫ ≥ ln(|XN | + 1), the right-hand side of (45)
is maximized by p∗:
E
[
l22(pˆ,p)
] ≤ E [l22(pˆ,p∗)] = (|XS|+ eǫ − 1)2
n(eǫ − 1)2
(
1− 1|X |
)
.
Proof. We show that for any ǫ ≥ ln(|XN | + 1), the right-
hand side of (45) is maximized when p = p∗. (Note that
by ǫ ≥ ln(|XN | + 1), p∗(x) ≥ 0 holds for all x ∈ X .) To
show this, we recall that if p = p∗ then m is the uniform
distribution over Y, as shown in the proof for Proposition6.
Let v = |XS |+e
ǫ−1
eǫ−1 . By (46) and the inequality of arith-
metic and geometric means, we obtain:
E
[
l22(pˆ,p)
]
=
v2
n
(
1−
∑
x∈X
m(x)2
)
≤ v
2
n
(
1− |X|
√∏
x∈X m(x)
2 · |X |
)
,
where the equality holds iff m is the uniform distribution
over X . Hence:
E
[
l22(pˆ,p)
] ≤ E [l22(pˆ,p∗)]
=
v2
n
(
1− |X|
√∏
x∈X
(
1
|X|
)2 · |X |)
=
v2
n
(
1− 1|X |
)
=
(|XS|+ eǫ − 1)2
n(eǫ − 1)2
(
1− 1|X |
)
.
E.1.2 l2 loss in the high privacy regime
Consider the high privacy regime where ǫ ≈ 0. In this
case, eǫ − 1 ≈ ǫ. By using this approximation, we simplify
the l2 loss of the uRR.
By Proposition 16, the expected l2 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-uRR
mechanism is maximized by pUN :
E
[
l22(pˆ,p)
] ≤ E [l22(pˆ,pUN )]
= |XS |(|XS |+2e
ǫ−3)
n(eǫ−1)2 +
1
n
(
1− 1|XN |
)
≈ |XS |(|XS |+2ǫ−1)+ǫ
2
(
1− 1
|XN |
)
nǫ2
(by eǫ − 1 ≈ ǫ)
≈ |XS |(|XS |−1)
nǫ2
. (by eǫ − 1 ≈ ǫ)
It is shown in [29] that the expected l2 loss of the ǫ-RR is
at most |X|(|X|−1)
nǫ2
when ǫ ≈ 0. Thus, the expected l2 loss
of the (XS, ǫ)-uRR is much smaller than that of the ǫ-RR
when |XS| ≪ |X |.
E.1.3 l2 loss in the low privacy regime
Consider the low privacy regime where ǫ = ln |X | and
|XS | ≪ |X |. By Proposition 17, the expected l22 loss of the
(XS, ǫ)-uRR is given by:
E
[
l22(pˆ,p)
] ≤ E [l22(pˆ,p∗)]
=
(|XS|+ |X | − 1)2
n(|X | − 1)2
(
1− 1|X |
)
=
(
1 + |XS |−1|X|
)2
n
(
1− 1|X|
)2 (1− 1|X |
)
≈ 1
n
. (by 1/|X | ≈ 0 and |XS|/|X | ≈ 0)
It should be noted that the expected l2 loss of the non-
private mechanism is at most 1
n
(1− 1|X| ) [29], and that 1n (1−
1
|X| ) ≈ 1n when |X | ≫ 1. Thus, when ǫ = ln |X | and |XS| ≪
|X |, the (XS, ǫ)-uRR achieves almost the same data utility
as the non-private mechanism, whereas the expected l1 loss
of the ǫ-RR is four times larger than that of the non-private
mechanism [29].
E.2 l2 loss of the utility-optimized RAPPOR
We first present the l2 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-uRAP. Recall
that mj (resp. mˆj) is the true probability (resp. empirical
probability) that the j-th coordinate in obfuscated data is
1.
Proposition 18 (l2 loss of the uRAP). Then the expected
l2-loss of the (XS, ǫ)-uRAP mechanism is given by:
E
[
l22(pˆ,p)
]
=
1
n
(
1 + (|XS|+1)e
ǫ/2−1
(eǫ/2−1)2 − 1eǫ/2−1p(XS)−
|X|∑
j=1
p(xj)
2
)
.
(47)
Proof. Let vS =
eǫ/2+1
eǫ/2−1 , and vN =
eǫ/2
eǫ/2−1 . By ǫ > 0, we
have vS > 0 and vN > 0.
For each 1 ≤ j ≤ |X |, let tj be the number of users whose
j-th coordinate in the obfuscated data is 1; i.e., tj = mˆjn.
Since tj follows the binomial distribution with parameters n
andmj , the mean is given by E[tj ] = nmj , and the variance
of tj is given by Var(tj) = nmj(1−mj).
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Then, by (40) and (41), the l2-loss of pˆ can be written as
follows:
E
Y n∼mn
[
l22(pˆ,p)
]
= E
[∑
x∈X
(pˆ(x)− p(x))2
]
=
|XS |∑
j=1
v2S · E
[
(mˆj −mj)2
]
+
|X|∑
j=|XS |+1
v2N · E
[
(mˆj −mj)2
]
=
|XS |∑
j=1
v2S · Var(t(xj))n2 +
|X|∑
j=|XS |+1
v2N · Var(t(xj))n2
=
v2S
n
|XS |∑
j=1
mj(1−mj) + v
2
N
n
|X|∑
j=|XS |+1
mj(1−mj). (48)
Let u = eǫ/2 + 1 and u′ = eǫ/2 − 1. Then vS = uu′ and
vN =
u−1
u′
. It follows from (40) that for 1 ≤ j ≤ |XS |, mj =
p(xj)/vS+1/u, and for |XS |+1 ≤ j ≤ |X |, mj = p(xj)/vN .
Therefore, we obtain:
E
[
l22(pˆ,p)
]
=
v2S
n
|XS |∑
j=1
(p(xj)
vS
+ 1
u
)(
1− p(xj)
vS
− 1
u
)
+
v2N
n
|X|∑
j=|XS|+1
(p(xj)
vN
)(
1− p(xj)
vN
)
=
1
n
|XS|∑
j=1
(
p(xj) +
vS
u
)(
vS − p(xj)− vSu
)
+
1
n
|X|∑
j=|XS |+1
p(xj)
(
vN − p(xj)
)
=
1
n
(
vS
(
1− 2
u
)
p(XS)
+ vNp(XN) + v
2
S(u−1)
u2
|XS| −
|X|∑
j=1
p(xj)
2
)
=
1
n
(( vS(u−2)
u
− vN
)
p(XS)
+ vN +
v2S(u−1)
u2
|XS| −
|X|∑
j=1
p(xj)
2
)
(by p(XN) = 1− p(XS))
=
1
n
(
1 + (|XS |+1)e
ǫ/2−1
(eǫ/2−1)2 − 1eǫ/2−1p(XS)−
|X|∑
j=1
p(xj)
2
)
.
E.2.1 Maximum of the l2 loss
Next we show that for any 0 < ǫ < 2 ln( |XN |
2
+ 1), the l2
loss is maximized by the uniform distribution pUN over XN .
Proposition 19. For any 0 < ǫ < 2 ln( |XN |
2
+ 1), the l2
loss E
[
l22(pˆ,p)
]
is maximized when p = pUN :
E
[
l22(pˆ,p)
] ≤ E [l22(pˆ,pUN )]
=
1
n
(
1 + (|XS |+1)e
ǫ/2−1
(eǫ/2−1)2 − 1|XN |
)
.
To prove this proposition, we first show the lemma below.
Lemma 4. For w ∈ [0, 1], we define F (w) by:
F (w) = − 1
eǫ/2−1w − w
2
|XS | −
(1−w)2
|XN | .
For any 0 < ǫ < 2 ln( |XN |
2
+ 1), F (w) is decreasing in w.
Proof. Let w ∈ [0, 1].
dF (w)
dw
= − 1
eǫ/2 − 1 −
2w
|XS | −
2w − 2
|XN |
= −2
( 1
|XS | +
1
|XN |
)
w − 1
eǫ/2 − 1 +
2
|XN |
< 0.
(
by ǫ < 2 ln( |XN |
2
+ 1) and w ≥ 0)
Therefore, F (w) is decreasing in w.
Now we prove Proposition 19 as follows.
Proof. Let M = 1 + (|XS |+1)e
ǫ/2−1
(eǫ/2−1)2 . By Proposition 18, we
have:
E
[
l22(pˆ,p)
]
=
1
n
(
M − 1
eǫ/2−1p(XS)−
|X|∑
j=1
p(xj)
2
)
.
As with the proof for Proposition 16, let CSN be the set
of all distributions p∗ over X that satisfy:
• for any 1 ≤ j ≤ |XS|, p∗(xj) = p
∗(XS)
|XS | , and
• for any |XS| + 1 ≤ j ≤ |X |, p∗(xj) = p∗(XN )|XN | =
1−p∗(XS)
|XN | .
By the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means, we
obtain:
|XS |∑
j=1
p(xj)
2 ≥ |XS |
√∏|XS|
j=1 p(xj)
2 · |XS |,
where the equality holds iff for all 1 ≤ j ≤ |XS |, p(xj) =
p(XS)
|XS | . An analogous inequality holds for XN . Therefore we
obtain:
|X|∑
j=1
p(xj)
2
≥ |XS |
√√√√|XS |∏
j=1
p(xj)2 · |XS |+ |XN |
√√√√√ |X|∏
j=|XS|+1
p(xj)2 · |XN |
= p(XS)
2
|XS | +
p(XN ))2
|XN |
= p(XS)
2
|XS | +
(1−p(XS ))2
|XN | ,
where the equality holds iff p ∈ CSN .
Hence we obtain:
E
[
l22(pˆ,p)
]
=
1
n
(
M − 1
eǫ/2−1p(XS)−
|X|∑
j=1
p(xj)
2
)
≤ 1
n
(
M − 1
eǫ/2−1p(XS)−
p(XS)2
|XS| −
(1−p(XS ))2
|XN |
)
=
1
n
(
M + F (p(XS))
)
, (49)
where F is defined in Lemma 4, and the equality holds iff
p ∈ CSN .
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By Lemma 4 and 0 < ǫ < 2 ln( |XN |
2
+ 1), F (p(XS)) is
maximized when p(XS) = 0. Therefore, E
[
l22(pˆ,p)
]
is max-
imized when p(XS) = 0 and p ∈ CSN , i.e., when p is the
uniform distribution pUN over XN .
Therefore we obtain:
E
[
l22(pˆ,p)
] ≤ E [l22(pˆ,pUN )]
=
1
n
(
M + F (p(XS))
)
=
1
n
(
1 + (|XS |+1)e
ǫ/2−1
(eǫ/2−1)2 − 1|XN |
)
.
E.2.2 l2 loss in the high privacy regime
Consider the high privacy regime where ǫ ≈ 0. In this
case, eǫ/2 − 1 ≈ ǫ/2. By using this approximation, we sim-
plify the l2 loss of the uRAP.
By Proposition 19, the expected l2 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-
uRAP mechanism is given by:
E
[
l22(pˆ,p)
] ≤ E [l22(pˆ,pUN )]
=
1
n
(
1 + (|XS |+1)e
ǫ/2−1
(eǫ/2−1)2 − 1|XN |
)
≈ 1
n
(
1 + (|XS |+1)(ǫ/2+1)−1
ǫ2/4
− 1|XN |
)
(by eǫ/2 − 1 ≈ ǫ/2)
≈ 1
n
(
1 + 4|XS |
ǫ2
− 1|XN |
)
(by ǫ ≈ 0)
=
1
n
( 4|XS |+ǫ2(1− 1|XN | )
ǫ2
)
≈ 4|XS |
nǫ2
. (by ǫ ≈ 0)
Thus, the expected l2 loss of the uRAP is at most
4|XS |
nǫ2
in
the high privacy regime. It is shown in [29] that the expected
l2 loss of the ǫ-RAPPOR is at most
4|X|
nǫ2
(1 − 1|X| ) when
ǫ ≈ 0. Thus, the expected l2 loss of the (XS, ǫ)-uRAP is
much smaller than that of the ǫ-RAPPOR when |XS| ≪ |X |.
Note that the expected l2 loss of the uRAP in the worst
case can also be expressed as Θ( |XS|
nǫ2
) in this case. As de-
scribed in Section 3.2, this is “order” optimal among all
ULDP mechanisms.
E.2.3 l2 loss in the low privacy regime
Consider the low privacy regime where ǫ = ln |X | and
|XS | ≪ |X |. By Proposition 19, the expected l2 loss of the
(XS, ǫ)-uRAP mechanism is given by:
E
[
l22(pˆ,p)
] ≤ E [l22(pˆ,pUN )]
=
1
n
(
1 + (|XS|+1)e
ǫ/2−1
(eǫ/2−1)2 − 1|XN |
)
=
1
n
(
1 +
(|XS|+1)
√
|X|−1
(
√
|X|−1)2 −
1
|XN |
)
=
1
n
(
1 +
|XS |+1− 1√
|X|√
|X|−2+ 1√
|X|
− 1
|X|
(
1− |XS |
|X|
))
≈ 1
n
(
1 + |XS|+1√|X|
)
. (by |XS| ≪ |X |) (50)
When |XS | ≪
√|X |, the right side of (50) is simplified as:
1
n
(
1 + |XS |+1√|X|
)
≈ 1
n
. (by |XS |/
√
|X | ≈ 0)
Note that the expected l2 loss of the non-private mecha-
nism is at most 1
n
(1 − 1|X| ) [29], and that 1n (1 − 1|X| ) ≈ 1n
when |X | ≫ 1. Thus, when ǫ = ln |X | and |XS| ≪
√|X |,
the (XS, ǫ)-uRAP achieves almost the same data utility as
the non-private mechanism, whereas the expected l2 loss of
the ǫ-RAPPOR is
√|X | times larger than that of the non-
private mechanism [29].
E.3 Experimental Results of the MSE
Figures 10, 11, 12, and 13 show the results of the MSE
corresponding to Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8, respectively. It can
be seen that a tendency similar to the results of the TV
is obtained for the results of the MSE, meaning that our
proposed methods are effective in terms of both the l1 and
l2 losses.
F. PROPERTIES OF PUMS
F.1 Privacy Analysis of PUMs
Below we show the proof of Propositions 9 and 10.
Proposition 9. The PUM Q(i) (= Qcmn ◦ f (i)pre) provides
(XS ∪ X (i)S , YP , ǫ)-ULDP.
Proof. Since Qcmn provides (ZS ,YP , ǫ)-ULDP, for any out-
put data y ∈ YI , there exists intermediate data x ∈ XN
such that Qcmn(y|x) > 0 and Qcmn(y|x′) = 0 for any
x′ ∈ Z \ {x}. In addition, by the property of the pre-
processor f
(i)
pre (see (19)), if the intermediate data is x ∈ XN ,
then the input data is always x ∈ XN . Therefore, the PUM
Q(i) satisfies (4).
In addition, (5) holds for any z, z′ ∈ Z and any y ∈ Y,
since Qcmn provides (ZS ,YP , ǫ)-ULDP. Let Z(i) be a ran-
dom variable representing intermediate data of the i-th user.
Then, Pr(Y (i) = y|X(i) = x) = Pr(Y (i) = y|Z(i) = ⊥k) for
x ∈ X (i)S,k, since x ∈ X (i)S,k is deterministically mapped to ⊥k.
Moreover, Pr(Y (i) = y|X(i) = x) = Pr(Y (i) = y|Z(i) = x)
for x /∈ X (i)S . Thus, (5) holds for any x, x′ ∈ X and any
y ∈ Y.
Proposition 10. For any i, j ∈ [n], any x ∈ X , and any
y ∈ YP ,
Q(i)(y|x) ≤ eǫQ(j)(y|x).
Proof. Since Q(i) = Qcmn ◦ f (i)pre and f (i)pre is given by (19),
we have:
Q(i)(y|x) =
{
Qcmn(y|⊥k) (if x ∈ X (i)S,k)
Qcmn(y|x) (otherwise). (51)
Similarly, we have:
Q(j)(y|x) =
{
Qcmn(y|⊥k) (if x ∈ X (j)S,k)
Qcmn(y|x) (otherwise). (52)
Since Qcmn provides (ZS ,YP , ǫ)-ULDP, for any z, z′ ∈ Z
and any y ∈ YP , we have:
Qcmn(y|z) ≤ eǫQcmn(y|z′). (53)
By (51), (52), and (53), Proposition 10 holds.
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Figure 10: ǫ vs. MSE (common-mechanism). A bold
line parallel to the y-axis represents ǫ = ln |X |.
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Figure 11: |XS | vs. MSE when ǫ = 0.1 or ln |X |.
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Figure 12: Number of attributes vs. MSE (US Cen-
sus dataset; left: ǫ = 0.1, middle: ǫ = 1.0, right:
ǫ = 6.0).
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Figure 13: ǫ vs. MSE (personalized-mechanism) ((I):
w/o background knowledge, (II) POI distribution,
(III) true distribution).
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F.2 Utility Analysis of PUMs
Below we show the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (l1 loss of the PUM).
l1(pˆ,p) ≤ l1(rˆ, r) +
κ∑
k=1
rˆ(⊥k)l1(πˆk, πk). (22)
Proof. Let pˆ∗ be the estimate of p in the case where the
exact distribution πk is known to the analyst; i.e., πˆk = πk
for any k = 1, · · · , κ. Then the l1 loss of pˆ can be written,
using the triangle inequality, as follows:
l1(pˆ,p) ≤ l1(pˆ, pˆ∗) + l1(pˆ∗,p). (54)
Since πk(x) is the conditional probability that personal data
is x ∈ X given that the intermediate data is z = ⊥k, we have
p(x) = r(x) +
κ∑
k=1
r(⊥k)πk(x). (55)
In addition, by substituting pˆ∗ and πk for pˆ and πˆk in (21),
respectively, we have
pˆ∗(x) = rˆ(x) +
κ∑
k=1
rˆ(⊥k)πk(x). (56)
By (55) and (56), an upper bound of l1(pˆ
∗,p) is given by:
l1(pˆ
∗,p)
=
∑
x∈X
|p∗(x)− p(x)|
=
∑
x∈X
∣∣∣∣∣rˆ(x)− r(x) +
κ∑
k=1
(rˆ(⊥k)− r(⊥k))πk(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
x∈X
|rˆ(x)− r(x)|+
∑
x∈X
κ∑
k=1
|rˆ(⊥k)− r(⊥k)|πk(x)
(by the triangle inequality)
=
∑
x∈X
|rˆ(x)− r(x)|+
κ∑
k=1
|rˆ(⊥k)− r(⊥k)|
=
∑
z∈Z
|rˆ(z)− r(z)|
= l1(rˆ, r). (57)
By (21) and (56), l1(pˆ, pˆ
∗) is written as follows:
l1(pˆ, pˆ
∗) =
∑
x∈X
|pˆ(x)− pˆ∗(x)|
=
∑
x∈X
κ∑
k=1
rˆ(⊥k)|πˆk(x)− πk(x)|
=
κ∑
k=1
rˆ(⊥k)
∑
x∈X
|πˆk(x)− πk(x)|
=
κ∑
k=1
rˆ(⊥k)l1(πˆ, π). (58)
By (54), (57), and (58), the inequality (22) holds.
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